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JUDGE POSNER, JUDGE WILKINSON,
AND JUDICIAL CRITIQUE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Marc O. DeGirolami & Kevin C. Walsh*
ABSTRACT
Judge Richard Posner’s well-known view is that constitutional theory is useless. And Judge
J. Harvie Wilkinson III has lambasted constitutional theory for the way in which its “cosmic”
aspirations threaten democratic self-governance. Many other judges hold similar views. And yet
both Posner and Wilkinson—in the popular press, in law review articles, and in books—have
advocated what appear to be their own theories of how to judge in constitutional cases. Judicial
pragmatism for Posner and judicial restraint for Wilkinson seem to be substitutes for originalism,
living constitutionalism, political process theory, and so on. But both Posner and Wilkinson
also deny that they are offering a theory at all. This is puzzling. How do these judges simultaneously reject constitutional theory yet seemingly replace it with theories of their own?
This Article answers that question—a question that must be answered in order to understand the present-day relationship between constitutional theory and constitutional adjudication.
The perspectives of Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson are particularly valuable because they
have not only decided hundreds of constitutional cases but have also written extensively about
constitutional theory. Drawing on a close reading of revealing slices of both their extrajudicial
writing and their judicial opinions in constitutional cases, this Article makes three contributions.
First, it brings to light agreements between Posner and Wilkinson that run far deeper than the
heralded differences between them and that stem from their situated understanding of their judicial role. Second, it exposes the limited influence of judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint
on these judges’ own constitutional jurisprudence even in those cases where one might expect
constitutional theory to exert maximal influence. Third, it explains how judicial pragmatism
© 2014 Marc O. DeGirolami and Kevin C. Walsh. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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and judicial restraint are best understood not as constitutional theories but as descriptions of
judicial dispositions—character traits that pertain to judicial excellence—that can and should
be criticized on their own terms.

INTRODUCTION
“The most unexceptionable source of collateral interpretation is from the practical
exposition of the government itself in its various departments upon particular questions
discussed, and settled upon their own single merits. . . . How light, compared with these
means of instruction, are the private lucubrations of the closet, or the retired speculations of ingenious minds, intent on theory, or general views, and unused to encounter
a practical difficulty at every step!”
—Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833)
Not long ago, Chief Justice John Roberts dismissed academic legal writing as “abstract” and “philosophical” in ways unhelpful to the judiciary and
“legal practice.”1 His comments elicited a flurry of responses, but the discussion rapidly exhausted itself. The reason may well be that the tension he
highlighted has an enduringly familiar quality. There has always been a gap
between theoretical and practical perspectives on law in the United States
and the Anglo-American legal tradition more broadly. A tradition of circumspect separation stretches back at least as far as the anxious misgivings of
medieval English lawyers and judges with respect to “academic generalizations about natural law” and its role in adjudication.2
Today, the distance between judges and academic theorists is particularly pronounced in constitutional law. Judge Richard Posner, for example,
has argued that constitutional theory is a waste of time, ideologically motivated, and useless to judges.3 And Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III has argued
that all of the “cosmic” constitutional theories on offer now are fundamentally flawed and threaten democratic self-governance.4 Yet both Posner and
Wilkinson—in the popular press, in law review articles, and in books—have
advocated their own distinctive approaches to constitutional adjudication.
Judicial pragmatism for Posner and judicial restraint for Wilkinson have been
taken by many to be the same kind of theory that each criticizes. But both
Posner and Wilkinson deny that they are offering a theory at all. Posner has
gone even further, invoking Samuel Johnson’s old aphorism in likening a
1 A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts at 29:00 (C-SPAN broadcast June 25, 2011),
available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts.
2 PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 27 (2008) (describing the roots of the
friction between the openness of learned law to extralegal sources and the constrained
traditions of common law judging); see also Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 157 (2002) (“Classical common
law jurisprudence was articulated by reflective but politically engaged jurists in the 17th
century. . . . [T]hey were legal practitioners, not detached observers.”).
3 See generally Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1998) (criticizing constitutional theories of interpretation).
4 See generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012).
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judge who writes about constitutional law to “a dog walking on his hind legs:
The wonder is not that it is done well but that it is done at all.”5 This is all
puzzling. How do these judges simultaneously reject constitutional theory
yet purport to replace it with approaches like judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint that seem to be theories of their own?6
This Article answers this question through a close reading of revealing
slices of the extrajudicial and judicial output of these two distinguished federal judges. These judges’ writings hold particular promise for understanding the relationship of constitutional theory and constitutional adjudication,
for Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson have contributed to both. Both are
former law professors at top institutions—Posner at the University of Chicago
School of Law, where he remains a senior lecturer, and Wilkinson at the
University of Virginia School of Law. And they are prolific legal scholars.
Each has produced several books, dozens of articles, and a great deal of other
writing, and each has written specifically and extensively on constitutional
theory. Both have also authored scores of opinions on constitutional questions across their careers, so that one can usefully compare their judicial and
extrajudicial writing on constitutional theory and constitutional law (“that
least disciplined area of American law,” as Posner has put it).7 Having worn
judicial robes and academic gowns, they are doubly qualified to address constitutional law from the perspectives of both judging and theory.
It is also illuminating to examine these two thinkers together because
Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson sometimes treat each other as antagonists—even foils. Posner is a pragmatist; Wilkinson is a legalist. Posner
emphasizes the importance of economics, empirical inquiry, and reliance on
social science in the context of an overarching project to “overcome” law;8
Wilkinson emphasizes legal materials and judicial restraint in the context of
stressing the value of the rule of and under law.9 Posner criticizes judges who
mouth platitudes about the determinacy of doctrine; Wilkinson criticizes
judges who are in the grips of theoretical or sociological abstractions and
who feel comparatively unconstrained by doctrine. The two men appear not
merely to disagree but to come at adjudication guided by directly opposing
theories.
5 Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1699
(2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005)).
6 Theories, after all, are simply sets of general and abstract ideas that either describe
or guide a practice—in this case, the practice of judging in constitutional cases. See, e.g.,
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 116–17 (1985) (“Theory looks
characteristically for considerations that are very general and have as little distinctive content as possible, because it is trying to systematize and because it wants to represent as
many reasons as possible as applications of other reasons.”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Kant on
Theory and Practice, in THEORY AND PRACTICE: NOMOS XXXVII 49 (Ian Shapiro & Judith
Wagner DeCew eds., 1995).
7 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 237 (2008).
8 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
9 WILKINSON, supra note 4.
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Yet beneath these disagreements, there is a deeper and more fundamental harmony of perspective that unites them. This Article excavates and
describes that perspective, one that is particularly salient given their doubly
intermediate position between the Supreme Court and district courts, and
between academic and judicial discourse. This perspective leads Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson to criticize constitutional theories that ignore or
marginalize the relationship between constitutional interpretation and judicial role in constitutional adjudication. This is the critical dimension of their
writing about constitutional theory. But their writing as judges also reveals a
constructive dimension: more than a constitutional theory, what judges bring
to constitutional adjudication is a distinctive perspective that arises out of
their particular office within the judicial hierarchy. The influence of constitutional theory is less powerful than, and never abstracted from, factors relating to judicial role. The judges’ extrajudicial “theory disclaimers” should
therefore be accepted. Rather than as theories, judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint are best understood as dispositions that each judge advocates
toward the activity of judging in light of their particular role in the federal
judicial hierarchy.
This Article makes three contributions: first, it brings to light the fundamental agreements in these judges’ writing about constitutional theory,
agreements that run far deeper than their heralded differences and that
stem from their shared, situated understanding of their judicial role; second,
it exposes the limited influence of judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint
on these judges’ own constitutional jurisprudence even in those cases where
one might expect constitutional theory to exert maximal influence; and
third, it explains how judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint are best
understood not as constitutional theories but as descriptions of judicial dispositions—character traits that pertain to judicial excellence—which can and
should be criticized on their own terms. Our project in this Article is limited:
to identify a distinctive perspective in the work of two prominent American
federal judges and to pursue certain associated insights into constitutional
adjudication. Yet we examine Judges Posner and Wilkinson not because
there is something that binds the thought of these two judges as a unique
pair, but because exploring what binds them lays bare a larger perspective
pertaining to the judicial office that they hold. When they sit as judges, they
are not theorists on the bench, but judges—and they are working from
within a practice that generates a distinctive perspective on constitutional
adjudication.
Insight into this perspective emerges from careful consideration of the
different types of writing published by these two judge-theorists. Part I of this
Article—“The Judge at Rest: Extrajudicial Writing”—explores a selection of
Judge Posner’s and Judge Wilkinson’s respective extrajudicial writings about
interpretive method and judicial role in constitutional cases. In these writings, the positions staked out by the judges seem most divergent. Part II—
“The Judge at Work: Judicial Writing”—is the heart of the Article. It examines paired sets of their judicial opinions in three constitutional contexts:
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gun possession for self-defense outside the home, partial-birth abortion, and
perceived official favoritism of Christianity. And it assesses the relationship
of the judges’ extrajudicial writing to the ways in which they justify their decisions in their judicial writing. Part III explains that it is more helpful and
more accurate to understand judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint as
descriptions of desirable judicial dispositions. Once so understood, it is possible to criticize judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint as portraits of
excellence in constitutional adjudication. It is also possible to offer alternate
understandings of judicial excellence, and Part III does so by considering the
example of Judge Henry Friendly. By clarifying the nature of judicial pragmatism and restraint, and by critiquing them from the inside and on their
own terms, this Article sheds new light on the enduring distance between
judges and legal academics in their respective approaches to constitutional
adjudication.
In the end, there is an important truth in Chief Justice Roberts’s observations about the separation of the bench and the academy. A judge, as Roberts put it in more recent remarks, possesses a particular perspective,
outlook, and set of concerns—a distinctive “way of looking at issues.”10 That
perspective influences a judge’s writing on and off the bench. And it suggests that when Judges Posner and Wilkinson write about constitutional theory, they are not dogs walking on their hind legs, though they are often made
to look that way by academic critics who have misunderstood their projects,
just as they at times misunderstand the projects of constitutional theorists.
The judges and the theorists are talking and walking past one another. It is
only by recognizing that their projects are distinctive, and by resisting the
impulse to merge them, that the two can reach a mutual understanding.
I.

THE JUDGE

AT

REST: EXTRAJUDICIAL WRITING

This Part explores Judge Posner’s and Judge Wilkinson’s respective
extrajudicial writing—their writing as judges “at rest”—that is, while still very
much judges but not engaged in their official judicial work.11 What appears
to emerge is mutual intellectual antagonism. Yet beneath this layer of disagreement, a more complex and extensive substratum of commonalities
exists. These commonalities pertain to the judges’ shift from theory to disposition as a guide to the practice of constitutional adjudication.
Judge Wilkinson and Judge Posner object to prevailing academic methods of constitutional theorizing that marginalize judicial role even as they
purport to offer prescriptions for constitutional adjudication. This overarching critique often is manifested as a specific objection against constitutional
10 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices on the Job, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/justices-on-the-job/?_php=true&_type=blogs
&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 (reporting Chief Justice Roberts’s remarks at the June
2013 Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference).
11 The article does not aim at a comprehensive intellectual history. The selections are
intended to highlight specific features of each judge’s writing that best reveal how each has
articulated his critique of constitutional theory.
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theories that proceed from the “top-down”—that is, in such a way that principles outside the law (often derived from academic moral or political philosophy) are said to control constitutional adjudication.12 It is also manifested in
a criticism of constitutional theories that demand thoroughgoing interpretive consistency by scrupulous adherence to the particular principles or
methods they espouse, without allowing space for the legitimate exercise of
judicial discretion.
A.

Posner’s Judicial Pragmatism at Rest

Judge Posner’s most recent in-depth writing about constitutional theory
appears in two chapters of his book, Reflections on Judging. Chapter six concerns judicial restraint, while chapter seven discusses theories of interpretation. Posner distinguishes judicial restraint from theories of constitutional
interpretation on the ground that judicial restraint does not purport to provide a single right answer to questions of constitutional interpretation. Posner surveys the views of various influential apostles of judicial restraint,
dubbed “Thayerians” because of their genealogical connection to the form of
judicial restraint first advanced by James Bradley Thayer. And he concludes
that none of them (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and Alexander Bickel) “had any idea how legal analysis would yield an
answer to a question arising under one of the many vague or archaic provisions of the Constitution.”13 This makes sense, Posner explains, because if a
Thayerian judge actually does have a theory that supplies these answers, “he
will feel lawless in failing to apply it.”14 After all, the whole point of a constitutional theory, Posner says, is to generate right answers to cases:
Modern constitutional theories—whether Bork’s or Scalia’s originalism, or
Ely’s representation reinforcement, or Breyer’s active liberty, or the Constitution as common law, or the living Constitution, or the unwritten Constitution . . ., or the invisible Constitution, or living originalism, or the moral
reading of the Constitution, or libertarianism, or the Constitution in exile,
or anything else—are designed to tell judges, particularly Supreme Court
Justices, how to decide cases correctly rather than merely sensibly or
prudently.15

In his chapters on judicial restraint and constitutional theory, Posner
describes the various approaches to constitutional adjudication he examines
as “coping strategies for appellate judges”16 inasmuch as they “provide an
12 Not all judges at all times share this type of objection to constitutional theory. Compare, for example, the very different type of judicial critique of the academy made by Judge
J. Skelly Wright more than forty years ago. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly
Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971). Still, the kinds of criticisms
advanced by Judges Posner and Wilkinson are not altogether uncommon ones today.
13 RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 167 (2013).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 166.
16 Id. at 149, 178.
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escape from the need to grapple with the complexity of today’s world.”17 As
an alternative, Posner advocates “[a] realistic approach to interpretation . . .
that is analytically simple, that shifts the judicial focus to factual inquiry.”18
This approach has three features:
[If] the statute is clear, fine; if it’s not clear, let’s try to figure out what the
legislature’s general aim or thinking was and interpret the statute to advance
that aim. . . . If we can’t figure out what the aim is, we’ll have no alternative
but to assume the role of pro tem legislators and impose some reasonable
meaning on the statute.19

Beyond this, there is little, if anything, that constitutional theory can contribute: “Theories of statutory and constitutional interpretation are clutter and
the last thing our courts need is more clutter.”20
The ideas in Reflections on Judging are the latest developments of arguments that Judge Posner has elaborated for decades. In 1990, Posner published The Problems of Jurisprudence,21 where he turned from his earlier focus
on law and economics and law and literature more explicitly toward constitutional theory and constitutional interpretation. In chapter ten—“How to
Decide Statutory and Constitutional Cases”—Posner raises certain core ideas
about constitutional interpretation which recur in his later thought and
which form the foundation of his judicial pragmatism:
Interpretation can be decoding of communications (and there it is least
problematic), understanding, translation, extension, completion, transformation, even inversion. All that the term means concretely is that there is a
text in the picture, the text is authoritative, and the decision must be related
in some way to the text. Although this formulation may be slightly more
directive than a definition of interpretation as the mediation of reality by
language, it is not a formula for distinguishing sound interpretations from
unsound ones. Maybe there is no formula, no methodology. Correctness in
interpretation depends on the goal of the particular kind of interpretation . . . . But there is no agreement on what the goal of statutory or constitutional interpretation is. Maybe there are plural goals—fidelity to framers’
intent, certainty, coherence, pragmatically good results. These are related,
but different interpreters will give them different weights.22

Several important ideas emerge in this discussion. First, interpretation is
not a single activity or enterprise with a uniform meaning. Stripped of its
connection to the specific functions and purposes of the interpreter, the
essence or kernel of interpretation consists only in the existence of a text and
some connection between that text and a particular judgment. Very little of
interest, therefore, can be said about interpretation in the abstract or in isolation; indeed, in that vacuum, interpretation might just as easily signify
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id. at 149.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 234–35.
Id. at 234.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
Id. at 299.

OF

JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
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“understanding” the meaning of a text as an “inversion” of that understanding. “Interpretation butters no parsnips.”23
Second, the passage illustrates a kind of perspectivalism. Interpretation
takes shape only by its association with an interpreter and the aims or goals of
that interpreter. It is the role of the interpreter—his particular functions,
duties, purposes, and perspectives—that shapes his interpretive goals and
gives the activity of interpretation its meaning. Likewise, the interpretation
of a text depends on the role of the interpreter. Interpretive role and interpretive meaning are therefore intimately connected. “Law is an activity
rather than a concept or a group of concepts,”24 and any activity is pursued
by an actor through whose perspective the activity must be understood.
Third, it is impossible to judge whether an interpretation is sound or
unsound without recourse to the role of the interpreter. This is in part
because, as above, interpretation gains its particular meaning only as a practical activity pursued by an interpreter. But it is also because of the plurality of
sound interpretive aims or goals, and the laudable desire of conscientious
interpreters to pursue those goals simultaneously. There is no single goal of
interpretation, and no single goal of constitutional interpretation.25 Reasonable goals of constitutional interpretation can and often do conflict. When
they do, whether a sound interpretation demands the particular ranking of
values that is selected will again depend on the interpreter’s role and the
perceived hierarchy of interpretive aims as influenced by that role.
Judge Posner connects these ideas to an early account of judicial pragmatism and applies them to Brown v. Board of Education, which Posner claims
“cannot be shown to be correct as a matter of interpretation.”26 What he
means is that the authority of text—if considered alone—cannot justify the
decision in Brown. Indeed, it was the “vagueness of the text that permitted
reexamination of [Plessy v. Ferguson] in light of half a century of social and
political change.”27 He insists, however, that the “possible dispositions
toward Brown” are not exhausted by “interpretive certainty [or] utter agnosticism.”28 Instead, “our legal certitudes are pragmatically rather than analytically grounded,”29 and the pragmatic toolkit includes “political history,
common sense and common knowledge, and ethical insight.”30 Posner is
also plain that these grounds are well within the ken of the judicial role.31
And it is the “pragmatist tradition” which is largely responsible for the
23 Id. at 460.
24 Id. at 459.
25 This is in part because of the nature of interpretation, but also because of the openended quality of the portions of the text of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 141.
26 Id. at 302.
27 Id. at 307.
28 Id. at 308.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 309.
31 Id. at 308.
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healthy attack on “foundations, on certitudes, on tradition, [and] on Grand
Theories.”32
Many of these ideas reappear and are sharpened in Overcoming Law.
The four chapters comprising the second part of Overcoming Law discuss constitutional theory, the most interesting of which is chapter four—“Top-Down
and Bottom-Up Reasoning.” There Judge Posner describes “top-down” constitutional theories as those where
the judge or other legal analyst invents or adopts a theory about an area of
law—perhaps about all law—and uses it to organize, criticize, accept or
reject, explain or explain away, distinguish or amplify the decided cases to
make them conform to the theory and generate an outcome in each new
case as it arises so that it will be consistent with the theory.33

Though he acknowledges his own academic contribution to certain top-down
theories,34 he does not believe that most of them are relevant to constitutional adjudication. Posner criticizes Ronald Dworkin’s classic top-down theory of the Constitution at length, arguing that Dworkin would do better
simply to acknowledge that his theory of, for example, the right to abortion
has nothing to do with the text of the Constitution but is purely an exercise
in liberal political theory.35 The fundamental problem is lack of candor
about one’s interpretive role and aims: Dworkin is a political philosopher,
and his interpretive purposes and perspective are those of the liberal egalitarian theorist. Those purposes predetermine “his general theory of constitutional law, in which the clauses merge and lose their distinctness and the
issue of the right of abortion becomes the place of such a right in the liberal
theory of the state.”36
Judge Posner’s point is similar to the one in Problems: the plausibility of
an interpretation depends on the role of the interpreter and his particular
function, aims, and perspective. And any interpretation cannot be described
as sound or unsound outside the context of that role. The durability and
appeal of top-down theories has far more to do with the attractions of “temperament, emotion, or personal experience”37 than it does with their convincing resistance to countervailing arguments. Posner concludes his
criticism of top-down theories with puzzlement over the assertion that they
are derivable as an “analytical” matter, and that contrary interpretations of,
for example, the religion clauses or the Due Process Clause are simply
founded on “mistake[s]” or confusions.38 The soundness of a constitutional
32 Id. at 462.
33 POSNER, supra note 8, at 172.
34 Id. at 172–73.
35 Id. at 175–88.
36 Id. at 185–86.
37 Id. at 186.
38 Id. at 187–88; see also id. at 466–67 (“The razor-sharp logical and polemical skills
that we associate with Anglo-American philosophy are great tools of criticism but do not
get one very far toward the solution of practical legal problems, such as what to do about
abortion or coerced confessions or capital punishment.”). Posner’s most extensive critique
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interpretation, Posner writes, does not depend on its capacity to prove by
argument that competitor interpretations are just confused or based on
incorrect analysis.39
These themes recur in some of Judge Posner’s later books, and it is in
these that Posner’s judicial pragmatism is more fully developed as a reaction
against both philosophical and legalistic views. In Law, Pragmatism, and
Democracy, for example, Posner explains the distinction between “philosophical pragmatism” and “everyday pragmatism,” arguing that the latter is the
sort which applies to adjudication. “If you are an everyday pragmatist,” he
writes,
[Y]our pragmatism is likely to spill over into your practice as a judge or practicing lawyer. Certain characteristics of American society . . . discourage
reflection and abstract thought, neither of which has a commercial payoff,
and encourage the bracketing of deep issues because they tend to disrupt
and even poison commercial relations among strangers. An everyday pragmatist in law, an everyday-pragmatist judge for example, wants to know what
is at stake in a practical sense in deciding a case one way or another . . . . The
pragmatic judge does not deny the standard rule-of-law virtues of generality,
predictability, and impartiality, which generally favor a stand-pat approach
to novel legal disputes. He just refuses to reify or sacralize those virtues . . . .
He is impatient with abstractions like “justice” and “fairness,” with slogans
like “self-government” and “democracy,” and with the highfalutin rhetoric of
absolutes—unless he is persuaded that such flag-waving has practical social
value. For the everyday pragmatist . . . moral, political, and legal theories
have value only as rhetoric, not as philosophy.40

Posner’s emphasis on the “commercial” or “business-like” character of
judicial pragmatism conjoins his views of adjudication to his other academic
work on law and economics. And Posner’s judge-pragmatist exemplar is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,41 about whom he has written often and admirof the application of moral and political philosophy to law is RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
39 Soundness in constitutional interpretation depends instead on the function that the
interpreter is carrying out:
[N]one of the weapons in the armory of the analytic philosopher or expert legal
reasoner will or should deflect a person who believes that the fetus is a human
being and the abortionist a murderer. Those beliefs, like other fundamental
beliefs, live below reason and are not the less worthy for doing so.
POSNER, supra note 8, at 188 (citing HYMAN RODMAN ET AL., THE ABORTION QUESTION
(1987)).
40 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 11–12 (2003) [hereinafter
POSNER, LAW]; see also id. at 49–50 (“I have found little in . . . modern pragmatic philosophy
that law can use. But the pragmatic mood . . . has much to contribute to law.”); Richard A.
Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 539 (2012) (“Judges
who don’t insist that a legalistic algorithm will decide every case are what I call
‘pragmatists,’ not in some pretentious philosophical sense but in the sense of an approach
to decision making that emphasizes consequences over doctrine.”).
41 Holmes combines ideal features of philosophical and everyday pragmatism in Posner’s account. See POSNER, LAW, supra note 40, at 57–59; see also POSNER, supra note 8, at
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ingly.42 The “lesson suggested” by Holmes’s career is that the ideal legal
thinker “should be cultivated, broadly educated, and intellectually wellrounded (rather than merely proficient in the doctrinal analytics taught by
Langdell and his successors)—not that any of the keys to understanding law
[are] held by disciplines other than law.”43 Yet Posner is confident that the
perspective that most American judges—even those many that do not attain
to the Holmesian ideal—bring to their work, including their work of constitutional interpretation, is that of everyday judicial pragmatism.44 Therefore
their constitutional opinions can only be understood as interpretive acts, and
judged as sound or unsound interpretations, through the prism of judicial
pragmatism rather than academic constitutional theory.
Yet if philosophical academic theory has little value for the everyday
pragmatist judge, neither does the “bottom up,”45 rigorously legalistic
approach to adjudication, which is forcefully attacked by Judge Posner in
How Judges Think. “Legalism” is the view that “judicial decisions are determined by ‘the law,’ conceived as a body of preexisting rules found stated in
canonical legal materials, such as constitutional and statutory texts and previous decisions of the same or a higher court, or derivable from those materials
by logical operations.”46 It is a fundamentally misguided method of constitutional interpretation that ignores the value of “looseness”—“flexible, or nonliteral” judicial construction that is capable of making sense of constitutional
provisions “ratified more than two centuries ago.”47 Though Posner admits
195–96 (“If Holmes had the finest philosophical mind in the history of judging, one might
think him the prime candidate to have worked out the sort of comprehensive, top-down
theory that Dworkin wants to bring to bear on questions of constitutional interpretation.
But Holmes’s philosophical bent . . . was manifested in [his] bringing to bear on discrete
constitutional issues the curious mélange of pragmatism, Social Darwinism, logical positivism, existentialism, vitalism, and other ‘isms’ that is his rich but far from univocal philosophical legacy.”).
42 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM
THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
43 Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 763 (1987) (including Benjamin Cardozo, Louis Brandeis, Roscoe
Pound, John Wigmore, Felix Frankfurter, Karl Llewellyn, Learned Hand, Jerome Frank,
Henry Hart, and Lon Fuller in this description).
44 See HOLMES, supra note 42, at 57.
45 POSNER, supra note 8, at 176–77.
46 POSNER, supra note 7, at 41 (citing Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988)); see also Posner, supra note 40, at 520 (describing “legalism” as the view that
“judges apply law, they don’t make it”).
47 Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 32–35, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
books/defense-looseness; see also Posner, supra note 40, at 539 (“And loose construction,
when applied to a provision of the Constitution, is not a theory, but rather a license to read
into the provision a judge’s views of sound policy responsive to modern problems. It is
when judges have such a license that there is pressure for a doctrine of judicial selfrestraint.”).
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that there is a “solid legalist core in judicial decision making even at the
highest levels,” he criticizes even “moderate legalists” for their marginalization of the role of political ideology and discretion in adjudication.48 While
a judicial pragmatist is sensitive to the “systemic” effects of a decision, those
effects are given unwarranted weight by legalists.49 And judicial pragmatism
does its real work—it is “what judges . . . do”—where “orthodox legal materials do not provide a secure bridge to decision and the judge lacks an overarching theory to plug the gap.”50 It is unsurprising to Posner that legalism’s
failure—and pragmatism’s necessity—is most acutely felt in constitutional
interpretation.51
The relationship of legalism and judicial restraint is complex, but Judge
Posner (unlike Judge Wilkinson) sees them in tension: the more inclined a
judge is to defer to other departments of government in constitutional matters, the less susceptible he will be to claims that judges are formalists and to
the shibboleth that they simply “apply law, they don’t make it.”52 Yet judicial
restraint—whose adherents, Posner notes, include Wilkinson53—is not a sustainable approach to constitutional adjudication. It has died in both the
academy and in the courts—in the former due to its “incoherence” and to
the rise of constitutional theory; in the latter due to the “exuberant activism”
of the Warren Court beginning with Brown, an eminently unrestrained decision whose correctness no one today would deny.54 The most that may be
said for judicial restraint in Posner’s account is that it, like legalism, may at
times be a pragmatic technique or strategy.55 But restraint alone—if not
integrated as one set of considerations within a larger pragmatic approach—
is inadequate.56
B.

Wilkinson’s Judicial Restraintism at Rest

The signature phrase for Judge Wilkinson’s approach to constitutional
adjudication is “judicial restraint.” But Wilkinson’s particular version of judicial restraint is not across-the-board restraint of the sort associated with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Instead, Wilkinson favors a version qualified by
certain substantive commitments (such as to national unity and against racial
48 POSNER, supra note 7, at 49.
49 Posner, supra note 40, at 541.
50 Id. at 542.
51 See id. at 542–43.
52 Posner, supra note 40, at 520–21, 536.
53 Id. at 534–35.
54 Id. at 546.
55 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 287–88 (“Judicial modesty or self-restraint . . . is not a
legalist idea but a pragmatic one.”); id. at 80–81 (describing strategic reasons for legalism
and stating that “it will sometimes be difficult to distinguish a pragmatist judge from a
legalist one”).
56 Posner, supra note 40, at 554 (“I would . . . suggest simply that the considerations I
have listed in favor of restraint are considerations that a sensible, pragmatic judge should
take account of, along with the other considerations that bear on decisions in tough
cases.”).
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grouping) and designed to serve certain ends (such as civility and decreased
polarization). And while he resists the label of “theory” to describe the set of
commitments that guide him in constitutional adjudication,57 Wilkinson nevertheless advocates that judges decide constitutional cases by reference to a
particular school of thought about constitutional adjudication.
That is the school of “restraintist thought” whose primary judicial exemplars for Judge Wilkinson are the second Justice John Marshall Harlan, Justice Felix Frankfurter, and Justice Lewis Powell.58 Judges in this school reject
as a “mirage” the “idea of literal answers leaving no room for judicial
insight.”59 As with Posner’s praise of “looseness,” Wilkinson’s rejection of
neat and readily applied solutions is a recurring theme in his critique of constitutional theory.
The challenge for the judge in this school—a school that accepts “a role
for reason within the rule of law”—is to distinguish the “voice of legal reason” from “idiosyncratic preference.”60 That Judge Wilkinson believes there
is something called “legal reason” marks a contrast with Judge Posner, who
has argued that “no general analytic procedure distinguishes legal reasoning
from other practical reasoning.”61 Wilkinson also describes “legal reason”—
“the process of applying impersonal principles of law to varying facts”62—in
precisely the way that Posner criticizes as legalist.63 It is thus unsurprising
that Posner describes the article in which Wilkinson lays out his “restraintist
thought” as a “legalist manifesto.”64
Yet in explaining how to distinguish the “voice of legal reason” from
“idiosyncratic preference,”65 Judge Wilkinson does not sound like the kind of
legalist that Judge Posner criticizes for overemphasizing the determinacy of
conventional legal materials. Wilkinson turns not to the language of legal
determinacy but rather to the language of virtue and vice. He commends the
virtue of intellectual humility, which will help the judge “avoid confounding
the familiar with the necessary and the unwise with the unconstitutional.”66
And he counsels judges not to succumb to the judicial “temptation to formulate wise policy” in undertaking the judicial “duty to make great choices.”67
57 See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 116 (“I have no theory. I offer only a set of worn and
ordinary observations that have all been voiced many times before.”).
58 J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 779,
802–03 (1989).
59 Id. at 803.
60 Id.
61 POSNER, supra note 7, at 248.
62 Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 792.
63 POSNER, supra note 7, at 41 (“Legalism, considered as a positive theory of judicial
behavior (it is more commonly a normative theory), hypothesizes that judicial decisions
are determined by ‘the law,’ conceived of as a body of preexisting rules found stated in
canonical legal materials.”).
64 Id. at 262.
65 Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 803.
66 Id. at 803 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67 Id. at 804.
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The commitments of the Harlan/Frankfurter/Powell restraintist school
ground Judge Wilkinson’s criticisms of both originalism and what might be
called constitutional moralism. Writing in the late 1980s, Wilkinson grouped
Judge Robert Bork’s originalism and Justice Hugo Black’s literalism into the
same “school” and lauded their insistence upon “standards extrinsic to the
judges themselves.”68 This emphasis on extrinsic standards may sound like
the legalism that Judge Posner contrasts with pragmatism. But Wilkinson is
not a thoroughgoing legalist. For he criticized Bork’s and Black’s assumption that “external standards will always yield answers” and their “suggestion
that intentionalism or originalism leaves little for the judge to do but look.”69
Nevertheless, Wilkinson does believe that the legalistic concept of extrinsic
standards is a vital component of wise adjudication. In the same article, Wilkinson also criticized academic theory’s importation of abstract moral reasoning into constitutional adjudication. Judicial invocation of the “cosmic
constitutional values” of “equality, liberty, property, [and] due process”
claims too “spacious a mandate for judicial interpretation.”70 Constitutional
moralism of this sort tends to confirm “the fear[ ] . . . that judicial reason has
no foundation in objectivity or restraint.”71
The same concerns animate Judge Wilkinson’s recent book, Cosmic Constitutional Theory, which explores “the surprising inability of modern constitutional theories of all stripes to restrain courts from imposing on others their
personal vision of the proper good.”72 Wilkinson takes on not only originalism and living constitutionalism, but also political process theory and pragmatism. Although he does not put it this way, all of these “cosmic” theories
are vulnerable to objections that they proceed from the top-down and they
insist on methodological purity that marginalizes legitimate judicial
discretion.
In criticizing pragmatism as a cosmic constitutional theory, Judge Wilkinson acknowledges that Judge Posner disavows the label of “theory” for his
pragmatic approach to constitutional adjudication. But Posner’s “supposedly
antitheoretical pragmatism turns out to be just like the other cosmic constitutional theories.”73 Pragmatism (like living constitutionalism) mistakenly
“ascribes to judges a role that is beyond their democratic authority by transplanting the methodology and vision of common law adjudication into the
inhospitable soil of modern constitutional law.”74 And pragmatism (like
originalism) problematically “places in the hands of judges a methodology at
once deceptively objective and impossible to deploy.”75
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 803.
Id.
Id. at 800–01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 801.
Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 8.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id.
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In developing his criticisms of Posnerian pragmatism, Judge Wilkinson
appeals repeatedly to conceptions of judicial role, and specifically to “the
values of traditional adjudication.”76 Wilkinson contrasts fidelity to past decisions (characteristic of the judge) with care for future consequences (characteristic of the legislator). He sometimes criticizes the pragmatic judge as a
passive victim of mistaken role: neglect of the values of traditional adjudication leaves the judge “adrift in a sea of legislative discretion.”77 At other
times, however, Wilkinson chastises the pragmatic judge as an activist policymaker: “pragmatism’s methodology provides generous incentives, excuses,
and cover for judges to turn away from their duty of restraint and toward the
role of aggressive junior varsity legislator.”78
Judge Wilkinson worries that Judge Posner’s instrumentalist understanding of judicial role simply cannot secure the restraint that Wilkinson believes
is required by a proper understanding of the judicial role: “pragmatic judges
may start by asking themselves what result would be practically preferable
and only then ask whether the traditional materials block that result.”79
Whereas pragmatic judges look to the past only instrumentally, traditional
judges seek to play by pre-existing rules because they are judges who “deeply
believe they should.”80
Notwithstanding these criticisms of judicial pragmatism, Judge Wilkinson does not embrace thoroughgoing legalism. In a retrospective evaluation,
Wilkinson charged that “the Rehnquist Court became progressively unable to
distinguish between those occasions that legitimately called for the exercise
of judicial wisdom and those that called for the application of law.”81 In his
view, “[s]ome contexts do indeed call for wise decisionmaking.”82 Judicial
wisdom is necessary, according to Wilkinson, in circumstances when constitutional text clearly protects some right, but the precise contours of that protection are not clearly specified.83 By way of illustration, “the Constitution
makes a strong textual commitment to free religious exercise and forbids, at
a minimum, the establishment by government of any church or faith.”84 But
the text of the First Amendment “provides sparse guidance on how close
cases such as McCreary and Van Orden [which dealt with different public displays of the Ten Commandments] should be decided.”85 Agreeing with Justice Breyer’s characterization of these cases as “borderline” and “fact76 Id. at 80.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 88.
79 Id. at 89.
80 Id. at 89–90.
81 J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-theDifference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1989 (2006).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. (referring to McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), and Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)).
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intensive,”86 Wilkinson concluded that “the occasion called fairly for judicial
wisdom, because the Constitution authorized judicial involvement but provided no neat answers.”87
Judge Wilkinson’s extrajudicial analysis of two other recent Supreme
Court cases, District of Columbia v. Heller88 and Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,89 adds further detail to his approach.
Wilkinson’s analysis of Heller develops his conception of judicial restraint,
while his discussion of Parents Involved illustrates the limits he would impose
on restraint-based reasoning.
Heller was a five-to-four decision recognizing a constitutional right to gun
possession for self-defense in one’s home.90 The decision occasioned a blistering article from Judge Wilkinson, who charged the Supreme Court with
committing the same sins as in Roe v. Wade.91 Although he believed that
Heller was not as egregious as Roe, “the methodological similarities . . . are
large.”92 In particular, “[b]oth cases interpreted ambiguous constitutional
provisions and both claimed to find in them mandates that put to rest an
extremely controversial issue of social policy, in the process overturning decisions by popularly elected officials.”93 Wilkinson characterizes as “equivocal”
the historical and textual arguments that consumed most of Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court and Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion.94 He argues
that the Court needed to make a discretionary decision, and he offers judicial
self-restraint as a tiebreaker: “[w]hen a constitutional question is so close,
when conventional interpretive methods do not begin to resolve the issue
decisively, the tie for many reasons should go to the side of deference to
democratic processes.”95
Yet there was little role for judicial restraint as a tiebreaker in Judge Wilkinson’s appraisal of Parents Involved. The Supreme Court held unconstitutional two school districts’ student-assignment plans because of the way that
those plans included race-based decisionmaking.96 Adopting an
unabashedly anti-restraint stance, Wilkinson praised Chief Justice Roberts’s
plurality opinion for its breadth, and in particular for its statement that
“ ‘[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminat86 Id. (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
87 Id.
88 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
89 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
90 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–30.
91 See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA.
L. REV. 253, 254 (2009).
92 Id. at 266.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 272.
95 Id. at 267.
96 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 704–05
(2007).
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ing on the basis of race.’ ”97 Wilkinson acknowledges “great risks in this sort
of ringing clarity, particularly in an area so burdened by history, so fraught
with contemporary controversy, and so open to strong opposing argument.”98 But he believes that “there are far greater risks in failing to defend
a principle that is not easily sliced and diced or otherwise compromised.”99
Accordingly, he criticizes Justice Kennedy’s concurrence for failing to recognize the substantial “drawbacks of allowing just a little use of race”100: extensive litigation, the difficulty of drawing lines, and the risk that “citizens may
start perceiving themselves in the officially sanctioned categories.”101
Judicial restraint, “admirable as a general matter, carries three distinct
risks when racial classifications are involved”: risks to the rule of law (“breaking the Fourteenth Amendment’s most solemn command”), risks to the individual citizen (“whose rights are determined by resort to his race”), and risks
to society itself (“of interminable race-based rancor”).102 Justice Breyer’s dissent appeals to all the values that Judge Wilkinson himself champions: “deference to democracy,” “appreciation for local experimentation,” “diminished
litigation,” “judicial restraint,” and “above all, the binding ties to one nation
that conservatives have wanted all along.”103 Yet the opinion “fail[s] ultimately to persuade,” Wilkinson asserts, “because it recognizes few, if any, limits to the explicit use of race and ethnicity in public decisions.”104
Judge Wilkinson’s praise of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Parents
Involved for its unstinting adherence to a particular vision of racial equality
may seem surprising in light of the critical project of Cosmic Constitutional
Theory. But the Parents Involved analysis reflects a strand of Wilkinson’s extrajudicial writing not discussed in that book. That strand is on open display,
however, in his Madison Lecture delivered at N.Y.U. Law School, Toward One
America: A Vision in Law.105 In that lecture, Wilkinson argued—against the
“partisan and polarizing” spirit of the age106—that “law should consciously
aspire to promote a stronger sense of national cohesion and unity.”107 This
aspiration to maintain “a concept of American nationhood in a divisive and
rapidly evolving age,” Wilkinson asserted, should become a “third great purpose” of law, together with “the preservation of order in which freedom may
flourish and the protection of liberty itself from overreaching by the
97 J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No Other Way,
121 HARV. L. REV. 158, 161 (2007) (quoting Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.)).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 171.
101 Id. at 174.
102 Id. at 181.
103 Id. at 178.
104 Id.
105 J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Toward One America: A Vision in Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323
(2008).
106 Id. at 323.
107 Id. at 324.
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State.”108 To advance these three broad purposes, Wilkinson exhorts lawyers
and judges to follow seven principles: (1) respect judicial restraint; (2) be
sparing in what we seek to constitutionalize; (3) value the nationalism in our
Constitution; (4) restore a constitutional respect for community; (5) reduce
polarization (but not necessarily partisanship); (6) do not premise public
allocations and benefits on ethnicity and race; and (7) appreciate the importance of process.109
These principles are closely divided between those that counsel moving
slowly and carefully and those that point in particular directions to move.
But together they add up to the kind of normative theory that Judge Posner
criticized in his Madison Lecture at the same law school a decade earlier—
Against Constitutional Theory.110 Posner easily could level against Wilkinson’s
antitheoretical restraintism the same criticism that Wilkinson levels against
Posner’s antitheoretical pragmatism: in the end it appears to be just another
constitutional theory. For while Wilkinson’s vision for law is marked by skepticism toward theorizing of a certain sort, it is also animated by his commitment to a third “great purpose” of law to be implemented through a set of
normative propositions.
C.

Posner and Wilkinson at War?

The foregoing discussion of Judge Posner’s and Judge Wilkinson’s extrajudicial writings on constitutional theory recasts what are often claimed to be
their fundamentally contrasting approaches in an entirely different light—
for they share a very similar critical perspective. Indeed, while differences
between the two remain, we believe that their practical significance has been
misunderstood and greatly overstated.
Consider their respective prescriptions for adjudication when conventional legal materials “run out.” Judge Posner says that discretion fills the
gap;111 Judge Wilkinson calls that discretion “wisdom.”112 This terminological difference may appear to be more than semantic, but it is not. The discretion to which Posner refers is judicial discretion, and it is constrained by
judicial role. The same is true for Wilkinson’s wisdom. In their extrajudicial
writing, both Posner and Wilkinson regularly raise the constraints of judicial
role in the practice of constitutional adjudication. As Posner explains,
“judges in our system operate under both internal and external constraints.
That is as true of pragmatic judges as it is of legalist judges.”113 As judges, the
pragmatic judge may be no less restrained than the legalist judge; the legalist
no more restrained than the pragmatic.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 325–35.
110 Posner, supra note 3.
111 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 40.
112 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 794.
113 POSNER, supra note 7, at 253.
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The fact that Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson are judges explains
another common feature of their extrajudicial writing. Both regularly situate
their approaches to adjudication (constitutional and otherwise) by reference
to other judges. Posner proclaims that “[m]any of the most highly regarded
judges and Justices in American legal history have . . . been pragmatists.”114
And he recommends greater attention to the “neglected literature” on “writing by judges on judging.”115 Wilkinson associates himself with a particular
“school” of restraintist thought, identifying the school’s judicial exemplars by
name.116 And in assessing their judicial handiwork, Wilkinson singles out
individual judges for praise or blame, linking his case-specific assessments to
broader evaluations of each judge’s oeuvre.117
The perception that Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson differ significantly may be more a function of their professions in extrajudicial writing
than of practically meaningful differences in how they undertake their professional obligations. It may be that their extrajudicial accounts of one
another overlook important similarities stemming from their common judicial role. The next Part explores their judicial writing in constitutional cases
where their at-rest commitments to pragmatism or restraintism are most
likely to be apparent.
II.

THE JUDGE

AT

WORK: JUDICIAL WRITING

The previous Part explored the critique of constitutional theory
advanced in the extrajudicial writing of Judges Posner and Wilkinson. This
Part examines the constructive dimension of their thought in the artifacts of
judicial decisionmaking—cases. It explores how that constructive dimension
is manifested and developed in a selection of constitutional decisions
authored by these same judges.
This examination exposes a fact that is universally missed by critics of the
judges’ thought: more than a theory of constitutional interpretation (such as
pragmatism or restraintism), what these judges bring to the work of constitu114 Posner, supra note 40, at 542. Posner adds that “[t]his point is overlooked in Judge
Wilkinson’s article, [Of Guns, Abortion, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, supra note 91]. He
regards legal pragmatism as an activist theory, while describing famous pragmatists like
Holmes as apostles of restraint.” Id. at 542 n.82.
115 POSNER, supra note 7, at 256; see id. at 257–59, nn. 40–54 (citing, inter alia, FRANK M.
COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994); HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
BENCHMARKS (1967); HOLMES, supra note 42; Michael Boudin, Madison Lecture, Judge
Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitutional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 975 (2007); Charles E.
Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common
Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961); Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3 (1966); Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1936); Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173
(1992)).
116 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 802 (discussing Justices Black and Harlan and
Judge Bork as restraintists).
117 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 97 (discussing the work of, among others, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer, Warren, and Burger).
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tional adjudication is a distinctive perspective that arises out of their particular role within the judicial hierarchy. Our study shows how role-based and
institutional considerations shape and constrain these judges’ implementation of their more general theoretical commitments in constitutional adjudication. Constitutional theory can and does affect the shape of their
constitutional adjudication, but its influence is always less powerful than the
influence of factors related to judicial office or role. And to the extent that
constitutional theory does affect constitutional adjudication, it never does so
detached or abstracted from the overarching institutional, dispositional, and
role-based constraints that govern the judicial office.
We illustrate these points by considering selected constitutional cases
authored by Judges Wilkinson and Posner while “at work.” We have chosen
pairs of cases involving three specific issues—gun possession for self-defense
outside the home, partial-birth abortion, and perceived official favoritism of
Christianity—because they involve hotly contested and controversial areas of
constitutional law in which one might expect that the judges’ extrajudicial
constitutional theories would figure especially prominently. The cases
selected address sufficiently similar legal issues to provide useful comparisons, and together encompass a sufficiently broad set of constitutional questions to offer insights about their approach to constitutional adjudication “at
work.”118
A.

Gun Possession for Self-Defense Outside the Home

The first two cases in which we examine Judge Wilkinson and Judge Posner “at work” present the same question: does the right to possess a gun for
self-defense—as recognized by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v.
Heller119 and McDonald v. Chicago120—extend outside the home? Wilkinson
and Posner have answered this question in different ways. In rejecting a constitutional challenge to a gun regulation, Wilkinson assumed that the right
extends outside the home, but explicitly declined to decide that issue.121
Posner, by contrast, held a state law unconstitutional after concluding that it
unjustifiably burdened the right to possess a gun for self-defense outside the
home.122
118 Ordinarily, one might be uncertain how much of a judge’s opinion-writing could be
attributed to the judge’s own pen because much opinion writing today is done by law
clerks. But in the case of both Posner and Wilkinson, one can be fairly confident that the
judges’ opinion writing is substantially their own. Posner has indicated that he is the primary author of nearly all of his opinions. Richard A. Posner, How I Write, 4 SCRIBES J.
LEGAL WRITING 45, 45–46 (1993). Although Wilkinson has not written publicly about his
drafting process, his opinions have a distinctive and consistent voice (whereas the opinions
of other judges whose clerks play a larger role vary significantly in style from year to year).
119 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
120 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
121 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011).
122 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Each judge’s respective approach to answering this question is facially
consistent with his “at rest” theoretical commitments to restraintism and
pragmatism, respectively. But depending on the meanings assigned to
restraint and pragmatism, Wilkinson’s opinion can also (and should also) be
understood as pragmatic while Posner’s opinion can also (and should also)
be understood as restrained. Indeed, when assessed as intermediate appellate judges vis-à-vis their hierarchical superiors rather than solely by reference
to their bottom-line conclusions, Wilkinson was more pragmatic than Posner,
while Posner was more restrained than Wilkinson. Moreover, the judges’
choices about how to operate within the role-based norms of judging mattered more to their decisions than an across-the-board application of their
constitutional theories. We emphasize that these observations are not meant
as accusations of hypocrisy. The judges’ extrajudicial constitutional theories
do affect their opinions. But these cases show that role-based considerations
are primary.
In United States v. Masciandaro,123 Sean Masciandaro had been arrested
for possessing a loaded handgun while he slept in his car in the parking lot of
a recreational area maintained by the National Park Service, in violation of a
federal regulation.124 Masciandaro argued that the Second Amendment protected his right to possess the gun for self-defense.125 A three-judge panel of
the Fourth Circuit rejected the claim unanimously, but split in reasoning.126
Judge Niemeyer wrote for the panel on every issue in the case but one, concluding that the Second Amendment protected a right to possess a gun for
self-defense outside the home, that laws and regulations burdening that right
are subject to intermediate scrutiny, and that the federal regulation at issue
satisfied intermediate scrutiny.127 Writing for himself and Judge Duffy,
Judge Wilkinson joined every part of Niemeyer’s opinion except for his conclusion that the Second Amendment protected a right to possess a gun for
self-defense outside the home.128 Wilkinson explicitly declined to decide
that issue. Instead, Wilkinson assumed without deciding that such a right
existed, and then held that Masciandaro’s challenge to his conviction failed
because he agreed with Niemeyer’s application of intermediate scrutiny.129
Judge Wilkinson deployed one argument for judicial restraint in general, and one argument for judicial restraint with respect to gun rights in
particular. His general argument is democracy-based: “[t]o the degree that
we push the right beyond what the Supreme Court in Heller declared to be its
origin,” Wilkinson wrote, “we circumscribe the scope of popular governance,
move the action into court, and encourage litigation in contexts we cannot
123 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
124 Id. at 460.
125 Id. at 467.
126 Id. at 459.
127 Id. at 459–74.
128 Id. at 474–76.
129 Id.
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foresee.”130 This argument focuses on the relationship of the judiciary to the
instruments of popular governance rather than the relationship of the inferior federal courts to their hierarchical superiors.
Judge Wilkinson’s argument for judicial restraint with respect to gun
rights in particular is consequentialist: “[w]e do not wish to be even minutely
responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the peace
of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment
rights.”131 Standing alone, an unvarnished appeal to consequences seems
like the kind of argument that Wilkinson “at rest” would abjure as nonjudicial. But Wilkinson “at work” tunes the argument from mayhem to a judicial
key with an inference about Supreme Court intent: “[i]t is not far-fetched to
think the Heller Court wished to leave open the possibility that such a danger
would rise exponentially as one moved the right from the home to the public
square.”132
The second case involving the extension of Heller and McDonald outside
the home is Moore v. Madigan.133 Judge Posner wrote for the majority on a
split three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit, holding that an Illinois law
that amounted to an almost-complete ban of gun possession outside the
home was unconstitutional.134
Judge Posner begins with a straightforward discussion of Heller and
McDonald, stating that an “implication” of the historical analysis in those
cases is that “the constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than
the right to have a gun in one’s home.”135 The opinion continues with the
textual argument that “[a] right to bear arms . . . implies a right to carry a
loaded gun outside the home.”136 Posner next turns to history, discussing
such authorities as the 1328 Statute of Northampton, the 1686 King’s Bench
decision in Sir John Knight’s Case, the 1707 third edition of Robert Gardiner’s
The Compleat Constable, and the fourth volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Law of England.137 Even as he interprets these authorities, Posner distances himself somewhat by making clear that his opinion’s historical analysis
is necessitated by Heller and McDonald: “[a]ll this is debatable of course, but
we are bound by the Supreme Court’s historical analysis because it was central to the Court’s holding in Heller.”138
Having parsed Supreme Court statements, analyzed the text of the Second Amendment, and investigated English history, Judge Posner pivots to a
discussion of twenty-first-century Illinois. He offers various hypothetical
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
right
137
138

Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 475–76.
702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 942.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 936 (emphasis added); see also id. (“The right to ‘bear’ as distinct from the
to ‘keep’ arms is unlikely to refer to the home.”).
Id. at 936–45.
Id. at 937.
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examples to show that any distinction between in-home and out-of-home gun
possession “creates an arbitrary difference.”139 The opinion continues with
the sort of analysis from Posner-the-judge that one might expect from Posner-the-theorist. Relying on an array of social science sources, Posner concludes that “the net effect on crime rates in general and murder rates in
particular of allowing the carriage of guns in public is uncertain both as a
matter of theory and empirically”140 and that “the empirical literature on the
effects of allowing the carriage of guns in public fails to establish a pragmatic
defense of the Illinois law.”141 He then ties this empirical excursion back to
conventional legal analysis with a statement that simultaneously follows the
Supreme Court’s lead and undermines its approach:
Anyway the Supreme Court made clear in Heller that it wasn’t going to make
the right to bear arms depend on casualty counts. If the mere possibility
that allowing guns to be carried in public would increase the crime or death
rates sufficed to justify a ban, Heller would have been decided the other way,
for that possibility was as great in the District of Columbia as it is in
Illinois.142

In the balance of Judge Posner’s opinion, he criticizes decisions by the
Second and Fourth Circuits on similar Second Amendment challenges for
failing to follow the Supreme Court’s lead. The Second Circuit should have
treated “the historical issues as settled by Heller,”143 while the Fourth Circuit
should not have declined to pursue the Second Amendment’s application
beyond the home. Explicitly mentioning Judge Wilkinson—the only judge
Posner singles out by name—Posner writes that the “vast terra incognita” that
Wilkinson avoids “has been opened to judicial exploration by Heller and
McDonald. There is no turning back by the lower federal courts.”144
The opinion concludes with the same mixture of lower court passivity
and pragmatism. Because Illinois failed to justify its “uniquely sweeping ban”
by showing “an increase in public safety,” Judge Posner writes, “[t]he
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment therefore com139 Id. Posner argues that it makes no sense for Illinois law to forbid a woman with a
protective order against her violent husband from carrying a gun in public, while allowing
“the resident of a fancy apartment building (complete with doorman) . . . to sleep with a
loaded gun under her mattress.” Id.; see also id. (“To confine the right to be armed to the
home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described in
Heller and McDonald.”).
140 Id. As if to underscore his engagement with these social science sources, Posner at
one point reproves plaintiffs’ counsel in one of the appeals for presenting a modified quotation that resulted from deleting a particular clause without including ellipses. Id. at 938.
141 Id. at 939.
142 Id. (citation omitted).
143 Id. at 941. Posner also criticizes the Second Circuit for its reliance on Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), to single out the home for special protection: “[T]he interest in
having sex inside one’s home is much greater than the interest in having sex on the sidewalk in front of one’s home. But the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside
the home.” Moore, 702 F.3d at 941.
144 Id. at 942 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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pels us to reverse . . . and remand . . . for the entry of declarations of unconstitutionality and permanent injunctions.”145 A final pragmatic adjustment
softens the immediate impact of the panel’s compulsion by Supreme Court
precedent. In recognition of the disruption that this ruling could have on
the regulatory regime for guns in Illinois, the panel orders its mandate stayed
for 180 days “to allow the Illinois legislature to craft a new gun law that will
impose reasonable limitations, consistent with the public safety and the Second Amendment as interpreted in this opinion, on the carrying of guns in
public.”146
These opinions expose different features of “pragmatism” and
“restraint” in the judges “at work” than they emphasize in their theorizing “at
rest.” With respect to the potential extension of Heller, Judge Wilkinson is
more pragmatic while Judge Posner is more legalistic. Neither approach is
more “judge-like” in the abstract, or even when assessed by their respective
“at rest” views. Role-based considerations were more significant than their
theories.
One common way to think about restraint is to ask how willing judges
are to displace legislation enacted by electorally accountable actors. In this
sense, Judge Wilkinson is more restrained than Judge Posner in these cases.
This may be surprising inasmuch as Posner is thought to be a Holmesian, for
Holmes was (in)famous for the extent to which he was willing to defer to
legislation.
But there is another—less widely appreciated but still important—way to
think about judicial restraint. That is to ask how closely a judge’s approach
to a case hews to that judge’s substantive views about a particular area of law.
In this sense, the judges’ positions on the restraint spectrum flip. Both Posner and Wilkinson are strong critics of Heller and McDonald. Yet Posner
extends the cases while Wilkinson confines them.
Judicial restraint is often thought of as involving a continuum of law as
against ideology, where the relevant law is the substantive law. If that were
the only type of law at issue, then one might conclude that Posner is more
willing than Wilkinson to subordinate his views about the Second Amendment to the law, and that he is therefore more restrained than Wilkinson.
But the relevant law is not only the applicable substantive law but also the law
that structures the relationship between inferior federal courts and the
Supreme Court. Highlighting this role-based, institutional feature of law
exposes a neglected dimension of judicial restraint: passivity in transmitting
the approach prescribed by the Supreme Court to new issues even if the
resulting decision is unrestrained (or unpragmatic) along the dimension of
substantive law.
This internal judicial notion of hierarchical restraint may explain
another feature of Posner’s Holmesianism. A Holmesian on an inferior federal court may view “legislation” by the Supreme Court (which is the way that
145
146

Id.
Id.
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Posner views constitutional decisions like Heller)147 with the same moral and
ideological indifference as legislation enacted by the legislature. If so, then
passivity is the order of the day in both cases. These considerations of the
judicial role therefore shed new light on the influence of constitutional theory on adjudication.
Even more than restraint, pragmatism may be understood in many ways.
Yet one uniformly important feature of pragmatism is attention to consequences. Accordingly, one way to determine whether Judge Wilkinson or
Judge Posner was more pragmatic in these cases is to ask which judge was
more attentive to consequences. This assessment is tricky. While both judges
were attentive to consequences, each manifested that attention differently.
Both Wilkinson and Posner evaluated whether extending Heller and McDonald outside the home might cause increased violence. Posner examined the
question by attending to social science literature and ultimately concluded
that the evidence was equivocal. Wilkinson relied on speculation that was
attentive to consequences when writing that “[w]e do not wish to be even
minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in
the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights.”148 Wilkinson’s approach seems less pragmatic insofar as it
turns on perceptions of consequences rather than hard data. But Wilkinson’s particular justification for considering consequences is connected to a
prediction about the limits of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment decisions and the need for deference by lower court judges to those predicted
limits. The impact of pragmatism is thus conjoined to, and interlocked with,
considerations of institutional role. Focusing on these role-based considerations again provides a usefully complicating perspective on the question of
the influence of consequences on constitutional adjudication, and in so
doing it improves our understanding of the influence of pragmatism.
B.

Partial-Birth Abortion

Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson have each issued two opinions
addressing the constitutionality of legislative prohibitions of partial-birth
abortion. Examining these opinions reveals not only that vertical stare decisis truly does constrain judges, but also that lower court judges use this rolebased constraint in different ways. For Posner and Wilkinson, pragmatism
and restraint do not tug against the constraints of precedent in these opinions but rather color their use of precedent to advance pragmatic or restraintist judging more generally. These opinions point toward a distinct set of
questions about constitutional adjudication from those generally studied by
constitutional theorists. And the implication of these questions is that rather
than focusing nearly exclusively on the Supreme Court and advocating an
ideal type of interpretive or adjudicative theory, theorists ought also to
147 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
148 Id.
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examine constitutional interpretation and adjudication in light of judges’
particular places and roles within an existing system of adjudication.
Judge Posner’s two opinions on the constitutionality of a partial-birth
abortion ban preceded both of Judge Wilkinson’s. They also preceded, and
in some ways previewed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg v. Carhart
that a state ban on partial-birth abortions was facially unconstitutional
because it reached too broadly and did not contain a health exception.149
Judge Posner’s first partial-birth abortion opinion was Planned Parenthood
of Wisconsin v. Doyle, addressing a Wisconsin law imposing a criminal prohibition on partial-birth abortion.150 Much of Posner’s reasoning in his panel
opinion, holding Wisconsin’s partial-birth abortion ban unconstitutional,
consists of unexceptional (but nonetheless controversial) application of
Supreme Court precedent.151 The standout feature of the opinion, however,
is Posner’s conclusion that the statute would be unconstitutional even under
rational basis review.152 There was no need for Posner to reach this conclusion after determining that the ban was unconstitutional under the more
demanding “undue burden” standard from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.153 Yet Posner’s supporting arguments for the irrationality of the law enabled him to formulate an approach to laws of this sort that
would later be adopted by a Supreme Court majority in Stenberg.
Judge Posner’s second partial-birth abortion opinion reached the same
conclusion of irrational unconstitutionality as his first, although this time he
was in dissent. Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of the Wisconsin law held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of
Wisconsin v. Doyle as well as a similar Illinois statute.154 In Hope Clinic v. Ryan,
the en banc court held that the Wisconsin and Illinois statutes were both
capable of being applied constitutionally, but the court enjoined their application to abortion procedures other than the partial-birth abortion procedure.155 Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote the opinion for the court, and
Posner penned a dissent.156
Judge Posner’s Hope Clinic dissent argues for the irrationality of laws
whose application turns on the location of the fetus that is killed: “From the
standpoint of the fetus, and, I should think, of any rational person, it makes
no difference whether, when the skull is crushed, the fetus is entirely within
the uterus or its feet are outside the uterus.”157 Because “[n]o reason of
policy or morality . . . would allow the one [and] would forbid the other,” the
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000).
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 466–67.
Id. at 473–74.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 876 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 879.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL205.txt

2014]

unknown

wilkinson

&

Seq: 27

posner

8-JAN-15

14:41

659

state’s reason must be “to dramatize the ugliness of abortion.”158 The legislation was “[w]hipped up by activists,” and public support for the laws was
based “on sheer ignorance of the medical realities of late-term abortion.”159
Those medical realities, as described by Posner in his earlier Doyle opinion,
are that “[a]ll abortion procedures, and indeed a vast number of surgical
procedures unrelated to the reproductive process, including forms of cosmetic surgery that strike many people as frivolous, are bloody and horrible.”160 Posner’s opinion in that case catalogs some of the more macabre
aspects of other abortion procedures (e.g., “crushing of the fetus’s cranium,”
reassembling of fetal fragments for assessing completeness of uterine evacuation, “injecting a chemical into the fetus’s heart,” and “drilling a hole in the
fetus’s cranium and removing the fetus’s spinal fluid through the hole”) in
support of the claim that “[i]t is difficult to see how anyone acquainted with
abortion techniques . . . could suppose partial birth abortion more gruesome
than the alternatives that Wisconsin has not attempted to prohibit.”161
Rather than an attempt to advance some legitimate state interest (such as
maternal health or the promotion of fetal life), Posner describes the Wisconsin and Illinois partial-birth abortion bans as intended primarily to make a
“statement . . . in an ongoing war for public opinion, though an incidental
effect may be to discourage some late-term abortions.”162
The other main thread running through Judge Posner’s opinions is the
compulsion and constraint of Supreme Court precedent, particularly with
respect to the absence of a textual health exception in the statutes. On the
need for a health exception, Posner appeals to the consensus of medical
opinion in the statement of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists163 and criticizes the majority’s reliance on two publications by doctors as well as the majority’s own statistical analysis: “It is not enough to note
that there is some evidence in support of one side of the issue, when there is
more evidence on the other side.”164 Posner concludes that “what is at
stake . . . is whether the people who feel that way are entitled to coerce a
woman who feels differently to behave as they would in her circumstances.”165 Supreme Court precedent dictates one, and only one, answer:
158 Id.
159 Id. at 880.
160 Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1998).
161 Id. (citation omitted). In the portion omitted with ellipses in the quotation above,
Posner describes these techniques as “lucidly described in Alan F. Guttmacher & Irwin H.
Kaiser, ‘The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New York: A Personal Insight,’ in Abortion,
Medicine, and the Law 546, 557–64 (4th ed., J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds.,
1992).”
162 Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 880–81 (Posner, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 883–84. This group opined that the partial-birth abortion procedure “may be
the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or
preserve the health of a woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with the patient,
based upon the woman’s particular circumstances, can make this decision.” Id.
164 Id. at 885.
165 Id. at 890.
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“The Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in decisions that we
are not free to palter with answers this question ‘no.’ ”166
In contrast with Judge Posner’s appeal to a standard of lowest-commondenominator irrationality to condemn a partial-birth ban, Judge Wilkinson
appeals to history and to the moral sense of Americans to credit such legislation. Both of Wilkinson’s opinions addressing the constitutionality of a partial-birth abortion ban dealt with a Virginia law. In Richmond Medical Center
for Women v. Hicks,167 Wilkinson wrote an opinion concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc after a split panel held the law unconstitutional based on
the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Nebraska’s similar law in Stenberg v. Carhart.168 Wilkinson later wrote in support of the opposite conclusion after the
Supreme Court upheld a similar federal ban in Gonzales v. Carhart.169
Both of Judge Wilkinson’s opinions condemn the practice of partialbirth abortion; the difference in outcome is attributed entirely to Supreme
Court precedent. Judge Wilkinson’s first concurrence has a two-part structure. The first part reflects on the disjunction between morality and constitutional law with respect to abortion and laments the state of the law,
characterizing constitutional protection for the partial-birth abortion procedure as “simply and indescribably sad.”170 Wilkinson writes, seemingly in his
own voice, that “ending the life of an infant at the moment of its birth is a
uniquely disturbing act.”171 But the following sentence is more impersonal:
“At the very least, the democratic process should not be precluded from coming to that judgment.”172 Invoking the New Deal and the Great Society, Wilkinson argues that one function of the democratic process is “to soften the
harsh blows of life”173: “I am at a loss to explain how a partially born child
can be excluded from the American embrace.”174
The second part of the opinion consists of three sentences: “We do not
write upon a clean slate here. As circuit judges, we are bound to follow the
166 Id.
167 422 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2005).
168 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
169 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). The Court in Gonzales distinguished the
federal statute from the state statute at issue in Stenberg on the ground that it did not reach
as broadly, and that a textual health exception was not necessary. Id. at 151–55. On
remand after Gonzales, the same panel that first held the Virginia law unconstitutional
again found it unconstitutional by the same vote. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2008). Upon reconsideration by the Fourth Circuit en banc,
however, the court of appeals voted six to five to uphold the law. Richmond Med. Ctr. for
Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion for the court, and Wilkinson wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 180 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
170 Hicks, 422 F.3d at 162 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 161.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 161–62.
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Supreme Court. I can find no fair basis for distinguishing this case from
Stenberg v. Carhart. For that reason, I vote to deny rehearing en banc.”175
Revisiting the case after remand in Gonzales, Judge Wilkinson’s opinion
begins by stating that the court should “uphold Virginia’s statute because it is
similar in critical respects to the federal statute upheld by the Supreme
Court.”176 After explaining these similarities, and arguing that a facial challenge to Virginia’s statute “was inappropriate from the start,”177 Wilkinson
spends the remainder of his opinion addressing institutional competence
and the lessons of history. Partial-birth abortion, he writes, “is a brutal business for which we are asked to provide constitutional protection, and nothing
in law or precedent requires that we do so.”178 He then considers three time
periods—“past, present, and future”179—to explain his position.
The “past” is comprised of various historical reflections: “It is inconceivable that the founding generation or the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that their Constitution dealt with the subject of partial-birth
abortion.”180 He observes that “our forebears would have been amazed to
discover that the Constitution had whisked the issue of partial-birth abortion
from the legislative branch and through some mysterious process assigned it
to the courts.”181 Protection for partial-birth abortion does not “find a foothold in the ideals of equality and liberation from bondage that motivated the
conflict out of which the Fourteenth Amendment grew.”182 And “[i]t disrespects our forebears to make such inventions of their intentions and to
invoke the greatness of their creation for ending the creation of a life halfway
into this world.”183
The “present” focuses on the “difficult and intractable”184 nature of the
abortion issue, relying on this intractability as a reason against resolving these
disputes constitutionally. Because “the very difficulty of the issue commends
itself to legislative compromise,” Judge Wilkinson criticizes “[t]hose who
would strike Virginia’s statute as unconstitutional” for granting “little voice”
to those opposed to abortion “on an issue where moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs have taken . . . deep root.”185
As for the “future,” Judge Wilkinson claims that though technical terminology today may “disguise what is happening, in the name of our founding
document no less”186:
175
176
banc)
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (en
(Wilkinson, J., concurring).
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182–83.
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The future, however, will not be similarly misled. The fact is that we—civilized people—are retreating to the haven of our Constitution to justify dismembering a partly born child and crushing its skull. Surely centuries
hence, people will look back on this gruesome practice done in the name of
fundamental law by a society of high achievement. And they will
shudder.187

Having invoked the judgment of future generations, Judge Wilkinson
qualifies his moral opposition with a familiar argument from judicial
restraint: he “would not deny the ability of democratic majorities to sanction
[partial-birth abortion] in law.”188
The substantive and stylistic contrasts between Judge Posner’s and Judge
Wilkinson’s opinions in this area are striking. Yet both sets of opinions successfully shaped the terms of their legal analysis in ways that were echoed by
Supreme Court Justices in subsequent opinions. Not only did Judge Posner’s
analysis in Hope Clinic prefigure the Supreme Court’s holding in Stenberg, but
Justice Stevens’ Stenberg concurrence explicitly adopted Posner’s view that the
legislation was “simply irrational” as well as his diagnosis of the legislature’s
motivations for passing the law.189 Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion
(which also explicitly endorses Posner’s position) does the same.190 By comparison, Judge Wilkinson’s morally laden language, not only echoed Justice
Kennedy’s dissent in Stenberg, but was also resonant in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court in Gonzales. These opinions reveal that the influence
of legal analysis need not run only from above to below in the federal judicial
hierarchy, but that issue-shaping influence can run from below to above as
well.
The different outcomes in Stenberg and Gonzales might cause one to conclude, as Posner later did extrajudicially, that the Supreme Court’s partialbirth abortion course reversal simply means that the Court is a “political
court.”191 As it happens, however, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Part IV
of Gonzales is largely prefigured by the reasoning in Part III of Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion in Hope Clinic,192 so that it is something of an over187 Id. at 183.
188 Id.
189 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946–47 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 951–52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
191 POSNER, supra note 7, at 278 (“[W]hat made the difference in the outcomes of the
two cases was not the minor differences between the statutes but the replacement of
O’Connor (part of the 5-4 majority in Stenberg) by the more conservative Alito. . . .”).
192 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999). Judge Easterbrook rejected the
facial challenge to the Wisconsin and Illinois statutes’ failure to include an explicit health
exception by reading the Casey language about the importance of a statutory exception for
“the woman’s life or health” not as “a universal rule, one applicable even when the procedure in question lacks demonstrable health benefits.” Id. at 871. He wrote that “when
state law offers many safe options to [obtain pre-viability abortions,] the regulation of an
additional option does not produce an undue burden.” Id. This was the position adopted
in Gonzales. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164–65 (2007) (holding that “the Act
does not require a health exception” because “[a]lternatives are available to the prohibited
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statement to conclude that the sole factor explaining the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gonzales was a change in personnel. Or, stated differently, if the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales shows it to be a “political court,” then it
is political in a manner that, at the circuit court level, is legal.
Indeed, even if one finds some merit in Judge Posner’s claim that the
Supreme Court is a “political court,” one might equally conclude that the
intermediate appellate courts are not “political courts” in the same way
because of their distinctive position within the judicial hierarchy. One way to
understand Posner’s extrajudicial description of the Supreme Court’s partialbirth abortion decisions as “political” is as a sotto voce criticism of the Court’s
treatment in Gonzales of his own judicial (i.e., legally and institutionally constrained) reading of the logical and sensible reach of Casey. As a piece of
judicial—rather than political or theoretical—writing, Posner surely believed
that he had offered the superior product: “Kennedy’s attempt to distinguish
Stenberg was so unconvincing that it makes one think that when he said in
Casey that overruling weakens the Court, he meant that only acknowledged
overruling has that effect.”193
Judge Wilkinson’s opinions hewed more closely to the Supreme Court’s
ultimate resting place in Gonzales. But the fact that Gonzales vindicated the
position of his dissenting colleagues in the first denial of en banc rehearing
suggests that Wilkinson was actually freer in that case to uphold Virginia’s law
than his opinion in support of the denial of rehearing reflected. Even so,
institutional and role-based constraints explain Wilkinson’s vote to deny
rehearing notwithstanding his morally and emotionally charged complaints
about the state of the law. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Gonzales includes some of the same types of moral and emotionally fraught judgments,194 but Kennedy had the ability to use those moral judgments to shape
constitutional law in a way that Wilkinson did not. Once the Supreme Court
legalized these considerations, but only at that point, Wilkinson was liberated
to follow its lead and expand on his previous misgivings with a more developed discussion which manifests his distinctive restraintism, one which
depends on democratic as well as nationalist premises.195
procedure”). Similarly, Judge Easterbrook held that where there was expert testimony on
both sides of a disputed medical issue, courts should defer to a state’s legislative choices.
Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 873. Again, this was the view adopted in Gonzales. See Gonzales, 550
U.S. at 164.
193 POSNER, supra note 7, at 278. Posner is not the only federal appellate judge to have
expressed dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s judicial craftsmanship. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Without Precedent, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, at 39, available at http://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/09/without-precedent/304161/ (describing
some of these complaints).
194 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158–59 (crediting Congress’s apparent conclusion that “the
type of abortion proscribed by the Act requires specific regulation because it implicates
additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition,” and stating that
“[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has
for her child”).
195 See supra Section I.B.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL205.txt

664

unknown

Seq: 32

notre dame law review

C.

8-JAN-15

14:41

[vol. 90:2

Perceived Official Favoritism of Christianity

Our final comparison focuses on two relatively recent Establishment
Clause opinions by Judges Posner and Wilkinson involving perceived official
favoritism of Christianity. Both of the opinions precede the Supreme Court’s
decision last term in Town of Greece v. Galloway, which reaffirmed the constitutionality of legislative prayer.196 Yet the Court’s historically oriented test in
Town of Greece provides a useful comparison with the opinions of Posner and
Wilkinson in this area. All three reflect doctrinally controlled and substantively narrow readings of the Establishment Clause, but stylistically the opinions are different from one another.
In Doe v. Elmbrook School District, Posner dissented from an en banc opinion of the Seventh Circuit holding that a school district violated the Establishment Clause by holding high school graduations at a Christian church.197 In
Joyner v. Forsyth County,198 Wilkinson wrote an opinion for a split panel of the
Fourth Circuit holding that a county board violated the Establishment Clause
by inviting area clergy on a rotating basis to offer opening prayers at meetings when the resulting pattern of prayers was heavily weighted toward explicitly Christian invocations. While the decisions exhibit different approaches
to the Establishment Clause, interpretive and role-related factors are intertwined in both, and institutional factors are at least as important as the
judges’ interpretive theories in their decisionmaking process. Their decisions as judges are not best explained by reference to their theories of pragmatism or restraint, but rather by reference to their situated understandings
of the relevant legal materials.
Doe v. Elmbrook School District arose out of a school district’s decisions to
hold high school graduations and related programs at Elmbrook Church, a
nondenominational Protestant Christian “megachurch”199 with a spacious
sanctuary. The choice of location was prompted in part by overwhelming
student votes to hold graduation at the church instead of a cramped and
uncomfortable gymnasium. A seven-judge en banc majority of the Seventh
Circuit held that the location of the graduation ceremonies impermissibly
endorsed religion and resulted in religious coercion.200 Judge Posner
dissented.201
Judge Posner’s dissent leads with the text of the Establishment Clause
and a curt discussion of its history, both of which “provide no clue” about the
permissibility of public school graduations in religious buildings.202 Posner
then moves to a heavily critical discussion of the “formless, unanchored,
[and] subjective” doctrine that the Supreme Court “has heaped on the
196 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
197 Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012).
198 Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011).
199 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 856 ( majority opinion).
201 Id. at 872 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judges Easterbrook and Ripple also authored
dissents.
202 Id.
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defenseless text of the establishment clause.”203 He relies on dissenting and
concurring opinions of Justice Thomas (criticizing the “endorsement test”)
and Justice Scalia (criticizing the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman) to underscore
that even certain members of the Supreme Court share his skepticism.204
Despite his dissatisfaction with the doctrine, Judge Posner discusses it at
length. He associates the Court’s principle that “all creeds must be tolerated
and none favored”205 with Edward Gibbon’s aphorism that
The judge should not be concerned with the truth or falsity of any religious
faith but should regard the various faiths as “equally useful” from the standpoint of society, in recognition of the importance Americans attach to religion, the diversity and intensity of their religious beliefs and observances, and
the bitterness and strife that the government’s taking sides among competing faiths would engender.206

He observes that “purely secular considerations, such as seating capacity,
comfort, location, and price, may well have made the church the best alternative to the school’s gym.”207 The graduation ceremony itself was entirely secular as well: Posner distinguishes Lee v. Weisman, Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, and Stone v. Graham on the ground that in those cases religion
was part of the substance of the proceedings.208 Though he acknowledges
the presence of religious imagery and literature in the church,209 there is no
evidence that school officials “endorsed” anything relating to religion,210
another tacit affirmation of the Supreme Court’s favored approach to this
issue.
From the perspective of purely pragmatic adjudication, Judge Posner’s
emphasis on text, history, and doctrine is somewhat unexpected. Textual
fidelity and historical inquiry tend not to be methods that pragmatists favor,
at least not above other interpretive tools;211 yet here, these considerations
lead the opinion and appear to assume lexical priority over other interpretive
methods. That is, not only are text and history included in the dissent, and
not only do they take pride of place, but it is only because text and history do
not foreclose recognition of other values or materials—indeed, only because
text and history provide little assistance at all—that Posner is liberated to
203 Id.
204 Id. (citing Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
205 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
206 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 874.
208 Id. at 874–75.
209 Id. at 876–77.
210 Id. at 874 (“[T]here is no evidence that school officials endorsed or encouraged this
or any other religious activity during the graduation.”).
211 See John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
685, 694–95 (1999) (“Antiformalists believe that when a clear text produces a result plainly
at variance with the overall policy of the legislation, judges should adapt the specific text to
its ultimate purpose.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL205.txt

666

unknown

Seq: 34

notre dame law review

8-JAN-15

14:41

[vol. 90:2

range over more conventionally pragmatic considerations later in the opinion.212 The prominent position of textual and historical factors in this dissent—where, in theory, Posner might feel freer to ignore those interpretive
methods that he discounted—is noteworthy. Yet Posner’s emphasis on text
and history and their position within the opinion are unsurprising when one
remembers that Posner is not writing here as a constitutional theorist. His
self-understanding of his own role demands that he situate his views within
the discursive and interpretive practices of a court that is bound by a higher
authority, even when he writes only for himself.213
The relationship of Judge Posner’s reliance on precedent to judicial
pragmatism is more complicated. There is the usual definitional question
lurking here involving the range of interpretive tools at the pragmatist’s disposal. Posner has stated repeatedly that pragmatists follow text and precedent—indeed, that pragmatic judges “ordinarily . . . treat text and precedents
as the most important materials of judicial decision.”214 While an emphasis
on the bindingness of precedent to the exclusion of other interpretive methods might suggest a departure from pragmatism, that is certainly not Posner’s
approach here. Perhaps Posner has only tactical reasons for giving such
prominence to precedential arguments, though at least one of the reasons
for a strategic emphasis on precedent—to win over colleagues to his opinion—does not obtain here.
The balance of the dissent is laced with more conventionally pragmatic
language and argument. Judge Posner discusses the absence of systematic
study of the psychological or sociological effects of religious language and
symbolism on teenagers215 and criticizes the judicial armchair empiricism
that characterizes Establishment Clause jurisprudence.216 He is skeptical of
the plaintiffs’ claim of psychological coercion and the doctrine on which it is
based, describing it as “florid hyperbole” and “whistling in the dark.”217 The
most likely consequences of the majority’s decision are
first, to confirm the view of many religious Americans that the courts are
hostile to religion; second, to infuriate students and their families by depriving them of the best site for their high school graduation . . . ; and third, to
212 See Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 872–78 (Posner, J., dissenting).
213 One might argue that Posner only refers to text and history because he knows that
they are inadequate guides, and so referring to them does not interfere with the real
grounds of his decision, which come later. But a reading that makes better sense of his
reliance on text and history in other cases is that for Posner, these factors (as well as precedent) strongly recommend a certain outcome, and though he does not stop there, text and
history represent the first building block toward reaching his disposition.
214 POSNER, LAW, supra note 40, at 63.
215 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting).
216 Id. (citing Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision
Making: An Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (2012); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael
Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?: An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the
Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2012)) (“[J]udges inevitably fall back on their . . .
beliefs based on personality, upbringing . . . and so forth . . . .”).
217 Id. at 876.
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initiate what federal law does not need: a jurisprudence of permissible versus
impermissible rentals of church space to public schools and other public
entities.218

Is Judge Posner’s Elmbrook dissent an exemplar of judicial pragmatism?
Posner once described Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Van Orden v.
Perry—one of two companion cases decided by the Supreme Court that
involved the state-sponsored display of Ten Commandments monuments—as
distinctively pragmatic.219 Yet Breyer’s opinion depends upon particularistic
judgments about the monument’s placement, aesthetic surroundings, and
comparatively long history within the community without complaint—all factors that Breyer argued distinguished the monument in the Court’s other
Ten Commandments case, McCreary County v. ACLU.220
These are the very features of Breyer’s opinion that Posner praises as
pragmatic extrajudicially221 and yet also severely criticizes in his Elmbrook dissent. Posner believes that the majority in Elmbrook is creating a “jurisprudence of church furnishings” in which a constitutional violation will depend
on courts’ detailed inventories of church interiors.222 Yet these particularistic and fact-specific aesthetic assessments are some of the very features of
Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence that, in Posner’s view, exemplify
pragmatic adjudication.223 If Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence and Posner’s
Elmbrook dissent are both examples of judicial pragmatism, then something
other than judicial pragmatism is needed to explain the differences between
them.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the tension between Judge
Posner’s praise of Justice Breyer’s position in the Ten Commandments cases
and his Elmbrook dissent demonstrates that the latter is not at all a pragmatic
opinion. In part it surely is. Posner spends long sections of the dissent discussing plainly pragmatic considerations: the factual basis for making judgments about psychological coercion;224 the lack of reliable empirical data on
these issues;225 the likely effects of a decision against the church;226 and the
association of state approval of religion with the weakening of religious
fervor.227
But it is not pragmatic all the way down. Or, stated differently, legal
pragmatism incorporates nonpragmatic considerations in a way that a purer
form of pragmatism would not. Judge Posner’s dissent does contain features
218 Id. at 877.
219 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 320.
220 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
221 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 322–23.
222 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 878 (Posner, J., dissenting).
223 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 322–23.
224 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 876 (Posner, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 873.
226 Id. at 877–78.
227 Id. at 878.
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of “everyday pragmatism,”228 but everyday pragmatism is an insufficient
explanation for it. As Posner has put it: “[t]he case for legal pragmatism is
based not on philosophical argument but on the needs and character of
American law.”229 Yet this reference to American law brings to light that the
needs and the character of American law in turn depend on institutional
qualities that are not typically associated with pragmatism—at least not of the
more full-fledged, academic, or pure strains of pragmatism. They include
“legalist” methods which sound in text and history; the general preference
for “narrow” over “broad” grounds of decision; and a detailed accounting of
precedent (even if only for “forward looking” reasons).230 Posner has
described the “good pragmatist judge” as a “constrained pragmatist.”231 The
constraints, however, relate especially to institutional and role-based considerations. Perhaps a better description of Posner’s Elmbrook dissent is that it
represents what one might call “pragmatic constraintism.” The constraints,
not the pragmatism, control the opinion.
These constraints are particularly important for intermediate appellate
judges because their institutional commitments require them, on the one
hand, to apply and (at times) extend Supreme Court precedent, and, on the
other, to give district courts guidance. Judge Posner describes this phenomenon in the writing of Jerome Frank: “The difference between a constrained
and an unconstrained pragmatist is well illustrated by Jerome Frank in his
twin roles as bomb-throwing legal realist and Second Circuit judge. He did
not abandon legal realism on the bench, but he curbed it; his judicial opinions are well within the mainstream.”232
Judge Wilkinson’s approach to the Establishment Clause in Joyner v. Forsyth County also straddles the divide between what he describes as a restraintist theory of constitutional interpretation and institutional or role-based
considerations.233 Just as Judge Posner’s Elmbrook dissent is not unequivocally pragmatic, there is much in Wilkinson’s majority opinion in Joyner that
is not explained by a theory of judicial restraint.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Joyner held unconstitutional as applied
the prayer policy of the Forsyth County, North Carolina, Board of Commissioners.234 The Board’s policy was to invite area religious leaders to deliver a
prayer before board meetings.235 The invited leaders were of many faiths,
and they were slotted to pray on a first-come, first-serve basis.236 The invitation requested “that the prayer opportunity not be exploited as an effort to
convert others to the particular faith of the invocational speaker, nor to dis228 POSNER, LAW, supra note 40, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
229 POSNER, supra note 7, at 233.
230 Id. at 246–47.
231 Id. at 253.
232 Id. at 254.
233 Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011).
234 Id. at 355.
235 Id. at 356.
236 Id.
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parage any faith or belief different than that of the invocational speaker.”237
The Board formalized a written prayer policy after its practices had been
challenged in court.238 The policy’s stated goal was to “ ‘acknowledge and
express the Board’s respect for the diversity of religious denominations and
faiths represented and practiced among the citizens of Forsyth County.’ ”239
Judge Wilkinson’s majority opinion is structured as a straightforward
application of Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. It begins by
acknowledging that the Supreme Court has upheld the practice of prayer at
the opening of legislative sessions based largely on the fact that legislative
prayer “ ‘is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.’ ”240
Summarizing Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions, Wilkinson writes
that “invocations at the start of legislative sessions can solemnize those occasions; encourage participants to act on their noblest instincts; and foster the
humility that recognition of a higher hand in human affairs can bring.”241 A
“clear line of precedent not only uphold[s] the practice of legislative prayer,
but acknowledge[es] the ways in which it can bring together citizens of all
backgrounds and encourage them to participate in the workings of their
government.”242
The opinion thereafter cautions that “both the Supreme Court and this
circuit have been careful to place clear boundaries on invocations” because
of the risks posed by prayer in governmental settings.243 Prayer “can create
an environment in which the government prefers—or appears to prefer—
particular sects or creeds at the expense of others” and it “has the potential
to generate sectarian strife” that “does violence to the pluralistic and inclusive values that are a defining feature of American public life.”244 Therefore,
legislative prayers must “embrace a non-sectarian ideal”—“that those of different creeds are in the end kindred spirits, united by a respect paid higher
providence and by a belief in the importance of religious faith.”245 Wilkinson distills from Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent the following
test: “Infrequent references to specific deities, standing alone, do not suffice
to make out a constitutional case. But legislative prayers that go further—
prayers in a particular venue that repeatedly suggest the government has put
its weight behind a particular faith—transgress the boundaries of the Establishment Clause.”246
Judge Wilkinson’s application of this test supported the court’s holding
that the County’s implementation of its prayer policy was unconstitutional.247
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 343.
at 344.
at 345 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983)).
at 347.

at 349.
at 349–50.
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One of the prayers at a Board meeting “discussed specific tenets of the Christian religion,” and approximately eighty percent of the prayers over the
course of more than a year and a half “referred to Jesus, Jesus Christ, Christ,
or Savior.”248 Taken together, the prayers during the time period covered by
the complaint “did not ‘evoke common and inclusive themes.’ ”249 Judge
Wilkinson distinguished prior circuit precedent permitting legislative prayers
on the ground that the key feature in those cases “was the non-sectarian
nature of the prayer.”250 And he interpreted the Supreme Court’s dictum in
Marsh that courts should not “ ‘parse the content of a particular prayer’ ”251
to mean not that courts ought to shut their eyes to “patterns of sectarian
prayer in public forums,” but rather that they “should not be in the business
of policing prayers for the occasional sectarian reference.”252 “[C]itizens,”
he concludes, “should come to public meetings confident in the assurance
that government plays no favorites in matters of faith but welcomes the participation of all,” an assurance that the Board failed to provide.253
Judge Wilkinson has written extrajudicially that judicial restraint favors
deference to “the [d]emocratic [w]ill”254 and “judicial noninvolvement in
intense political controversy.”255 Or, as Judge Posner has put it, the
restrained judge is “highly reluctant to declare legislative or executive action
unconstitutional.”256 Because the Fourth Circuit’s decision struck down a
longstanding practice that had been implemented by a local, democratically
elected body,257 Joyner is not a decision exemplifying the type of restraint that
counsels deference to democratic majorities. Nevertheless, a policy of judicial restraint is not tantamount to abdication to majority sentiment, particularly if Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit precedent demanded otherwise.
Judicial restraint requires rigorous adherence to vertical and horizontal stare
decisis.258
Supreme Court precedent did not require this result.259 But the decision followed logically (though not inexorably) from Fourth Circuit prece248 Id. at 349.
249 Id. at 350 (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276,
287 (4th Cir. 2005)).
250 Id. at 351.
251 Id. at 351 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983)).
252 Id.
253 Id. at 355.
254 WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 20.
255 Id. at 58.
256 Posner, supra note 40, at 521.
257 Joyner, 653 F.3d at 355.
258 See Wilkinson, supra note 91, at 255 (discussing “the solemn duty of judges on the
inferior federal courts to follow . . . decisions with which [those judges] may not agree”).
259 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), which was reaffirmed and in some ways
extended in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), upheld a legislative prayer
policy and practice less neutral and inclusive than Forsyth County’s. The policy in Marsh
provided that the Nebraska legislature would choose the prayer and that a paid government employee—in this case, the same Presbyterian minister over a period of sixteen
years—would deliver it. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85; see also id. at 800 n.9 (Brennan, J.,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL205.txt

2014]

unknown

wilkinson

&

Seq: 39

posner

8-JAN-15

14:41

671

dent interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Chambers and
County of Allegheny v. ACLU to permit nonsectarian legislative prayer consistent with an inclusive “civic faith.” In a similar legislative prayer case seven
years earlier,260 Judge Wilkinson’s opinion for the court committed the
Fourth Circuit to an extension of Marsh that he and Judge Keenan later
found controlling in Joyner.261
Depending on the doctrinal particulars, the decision of a lower court to
apply a legal principle that extends beyond the earlier decisions from which
it has been extracted can be understood as a form of judicial restraint. This
is the type of institutional restraint on display in Judge Posner’s Second
Amendment decision discussed earlier, for example.262 Yet the exercise of
this traditional judicial function cannot reliably be expected to lead to results
that a theory of judicial restraint (in the democratically deferential sense)
requires. The truest description of Joyner is not that it is restrained in that
sense, but that it is not an implausible extension of Marsh as filtered through
the County of Allegheny dictum and the Fourth Circuit’s prior decisions.
Whether Joyner is persuasive depends on evaluating these moves within the
distinctive practice of judging, not on its conformity to a general theory of
judicial restraint.
III.

FROM THEORY

TO

DISPOSITION

We step back now and take a broader view. Part I of this Article focused
on the critical dimension of Judge Posner’s and Judge Wilkinson’s thought—
dissenting) (protesting the prayers’ frequent “Christological references”). The policy in
Joyner permitted leaders from a diverse group of religious institutions an equal opportunity
to deliver an invocation, speakers were self-selected and unpaid, and Forsyth County exercised no control over the content of the prayers. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 343–45. Judge Wilkinson’s claim that the Marsh Court “took care to emphasize” the “inclusive” character of the
prayers offered before the Nebraska legislature, 653 F.3d at 347, extends Marsh: Marsh
spoke specifically in terms of non-proselytism and non-advancement, but it did not state
that the only permissible legislative prayers were “inclusive” prayers. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at
792. Yet Judge Wilkinson’s opinion is hardly disconnected from Supreme Court precedent
either. The Joyner court’s holding is premised on a reading of certain dicta in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, a case involving the state-sponsored display of religious symbols, where
the Supreme Court stated that the “legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this
principle [of government non-affiliation with “one specific faith”] because the particular
chaplain had ‘removed all references to Christ.’” Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 603 (1989) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14). For further discussion of the
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine, see MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013).
260 Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
261 See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 348–49 (explaining that Simpson reaffirmed the principle that
controlled Joyner’s outcome). This assessment of Simpson’s effect was not shared in Joyner
by another Fourth Circuit judge who joined Judge Wilkinson’s opinion for the court in
Simpson. Judge Niemeyer contended in his Joyner dissent that a careful reading of Simpson
underscores the difficulty of distinguishing “sectarian” from “ecumenical” prayers. See
Joyner, 653 F.3d at 365 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
262 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
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their criticisms of constitutional theory. Each objects to “top-down” or “cosmic” theories and theories that leave no room for the exercise of judicial
discretion (Posner’s term) or judicial wisdom (Wilkinson’s term). But their
thought also has a constructive dimension: Posner embraces judicial pragmatism while Wilkinson champions judicial restraint. And Part II examined
various ways in which the judges wove these commitments into their decisions in constitutional cases even as it highlighted the limited influence of
judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint in these cases.
This final Part explores broader questions about the relationship
between constitutional theory and the judicial role in federal constitutional
law. Rather than offering constitutional theories of interpretation or adjudication that directly rival other such theories, these judges’ antitheoretical
views are better understood as making a different point altogether about constitutional adjudication. They are describing and advocating a particular set
of dispositions toward the judicial office. Pragmatism and restraint are for
them not theories of constitutional interpretation or adjudication but qualities of judicial excellence. After explaining how and why this represents an
improved understanding of the judges’ extrajudicial contributions, we argue
that each judge’s account of the ideal judicial disposition toward constitutional adjudication is nevertheless flawed. We then conclude with a discussion of another intermediate federal appellate judge, Henry Friendly. Judge
Friendly’s example more nearly approaches the ideal qualities of judicial disposition and judicial duty in constitutional adjudication than other judicial
paragons championed by Posner and Wilkinson.
A.

Evaluating the Theory Disclaimer

Although both judges deny offering a theory of their own, Judge Posner
and Judge Wilkinson do present their approaches as rivals to what they perceive as the defective offerings of academic constitutional theory: judges
should not be originalists, but pragmatists; judges should not be living constitutionalists, but devotees of judicial restraint; and so on. Yet the doctrinal
study in Part II suggests that neither judicial pragmatism nor judicial restraint
provides reliable practical guidance in the very kinds of cases in which one
would expect constitutional theory to play a more prominent if not decisive
role. Put another way, their approaches at work offer no clear answers to fill
the blank spaces in the following: “all else being equal, judicial pragmatism
counsels a judge to ______, while judicial restraint counsels a judge instead to
______.”
To the extent that judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint are offered
as replacements for constitutional theories such as originalism or Dworkinian
moralism, then, they must be judged as failures. Their core ideas are too
slippery, their substance too hard to pin down, and their guidance too inconsistent. As constitutional theories, they are therefore vulnerable to the sorts
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of objections directed against them by many academic theorists.263 In a
recent example of such criticism, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky claims that Judge
Wilkinson’s antitheoretical complaints are “profoundly wrong because there
is simply no way to avoid a constitutional theory in deciding, or having views
on, constitutional issues.”264 Surely Chemerinsky is right that “having views”
about constitutional interpretation is important if one is making decisions
about the meaning of the Constitution.
And yet it manifests a certain myopia for Dean Chemerinsky to criticize
Judge Wilkinson for failing to offer a viable replacement for academic theories of constitutional interpretation. Academic refinements in constitutional
theory often outpace both judicial uptake and judicial objections, and this is
to be expected in light of the different tasks of theory and practice and the
perennial separation between them. Furthermore, criticisms of this kind
miss what is valuable in Wilkinson’s and Posner’s antitheoretical approaches.
Judges’ extrajudicial criticisms of academic constitutional theory and their
own contributions to it provide windows on the larger world of constitutional
adjudication that offer distinctive lines of vision into the qualities of judicial
duty and judicial excellence. These insights—insights that concern dispositions and attitudes, not theories—come into focus by comparing what they
say (extrajudicially) with what they do (judicially).
We ought therefore largely to credit Judge Posner’s and Judge Wilkinson’s theory disclaimers. They are not offering theories of constitutional
interpretation or adjudication. If they are offering any kind of theory—any
fixed set of general propositions that describes or guides a practice—it is a
theory not of constitutional interpretation, but of excellence in judging. But
in fact, judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint are not sets of fixed propositions at all, and certainly not the kinds of propositions that are offered by
originalism or Dworkinian moralism. Those theories prescribe particular
263 For a selection of academic critiques of Wilkinson, see David Rudenstine, Self-Government and the Judicial Function, 92 TEX. L. REV. 161 (2013) (reviewing WILKINSON, supra
note 4); see also Nelson Lund, The Cosmic Mystery of Judicial Restraint, 14 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 100 (2013); Zachary Baron Shemtob, Book Review, 22 L. & POL.
BOOK REV. 162 (2012), available at http://www.lpbr.net/2012/04/cosmic-constitutionaltheory-why.html (reviewing WILKINSON, supra note 4); Jeffrey Rosen, Against Interpretation,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/books/review/cosmicconstitutional-theory-by-j-harvie-wilkinson-iii.html; Mark Graber, On Cosmic Constitutional
Theory, BALKINIZATION, (Feb. 21, 2012, 8:36 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/oncosmic-constitutional-theory.html;. But see Marc O. DeGirolami, Astral Appetites, NEW
REPUBLIC, (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/cosmic-constitution
al-theory-judicial-restraint (criticizing attempts to describe judicial restraint as “its own kind
of constitutional theory”).
The critical literature on Posner’s pragmatism is voluminous (although there is no
comparative study like that set forth in this Article). For a recent, insightful exploration of
Posnerian pragmatism with extensive citations to and discussions of other critical examinations, see Edward Cantu, Posner’s Pragmatism and the Turn toward Fidelity, 16 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 69 (2012).
264 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Inescapability of Constitutional Theory, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 935,
937 (2013).
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activities and procedures for ascertaining meaning and rendering decisions:
ascertain and fix the original public meaning of a legal text (originalism), or
develop the best principled basis for a decision by attending to the dimensions of fit and justification (Dworkinian moralism). Judicial pragmatism
and judicial restraint do not provide explicit guidance of this sort. They treat
the underlying activity as the practice of judging and then offer vague prescriptions for the manner in which to undertake that activity. Pragmatism
and restraint therefore can and should be understood in adverbial terms, as
modifiers for a particular activity—the practice of judging.265 The good
judge in a constitutional case is the one who judges pragmatically or
restrainedly.
But it is excellence in the practice of judging that is the judges’ primary
concern. Writing extrajudicially not only helps them to clarify the nature of
that excellence but also allows them to state their respective cases for it.
Understood as descriptions of dispositions characteristic of judicial excellence, judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint are not subject to the same
categories of criticism either leveled at the judges’ approaches by most academic critics or leveled by the judges against academic theories of constitutional interpretation. Unlike those theories, judicial pragmatism and judicial
restraint do not purport to offer direct how-to guidance (as originalism does)
or “one right answer” to constitutional questions (as Dworkinian moralism
does). Instead, the qualities of judicial excellence championed by these
judges are better characterized as proper dispositions toward constitutional
adjudication—as general orientations to constitutional law that Posner and
Wilkinson believe will produce reasonable and sensible decisions.
B.

Portraits of Judicial Excellence

Understanding judicial pragmatism and judicial restraint adverbially—as
describing a disposition toward judging rather than as a substantive theory—
helps to distinguish them as different in kind from such theories as originalism or Dworkinian moralism. But it also brings into focus an important
methodological tool that both judges use repeatedly to develop and explain
their views: recourse to certain exemplary (and non-exemplary) judges of the
past and present. In fact, Posner and Wilkinson frequently offer critical evaluations of other judges—discussing, assessing, and comparing their own
thought about constitutional adjudication to that of their subjects. These are
often useful and illuminating exercises in judicial self-reflection. As Posner
has put it, “[w]hen one considers that the appellate judge is the central figure in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the dearth of evaluative writing on
265 Cf. Timothy Fuller, Michael Oakeshott on the Rule of Law and the Liberal Order, LIBRARY
LAW & LIBERTY (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/michaeloakeshott-on-the-rule-of-law-and-the-liberal-order/ (describing Michael Oakeshott’s
account of the expression “rule of law” as standing “for a mode of moral association exclusively in terms of the recognition of the authority of known, noninstrumental rules (that is,
laws) which impose obligations to subscribe to adverbial conditions in the performance of
the self-chosen actions of all who fall within their jurisdiction”).

OF
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individual judges that is at once systematic, nonpolitical, and nonpolemical is
remarkable.”266 And indeed, judicial intellectual portraiture has been a
major subject in Posner’s extrajudicial writing.
Yet the importance of the judges’ focus on critical judicial biography
and comparative judicial evaluation can be missed because Posner and Wilkinson sometimes pitch their contributions as substitutes for academic constitutional theory rather than accounts of dispositions or character traits that
appertain to judicial excellence. Consider for example Posner’s and Wilkinson’s respective denunciations of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in
D.C. v. Heller.267 Each uses the occasion to criticize originalism.268 Yet in
criticizing the Heller opinion as exemplifying the intrinsic failures of originalism, neither Posner nor Wilkinson engages with the broad range of academic
originalist scholarship that remains untouched by their objections to Heller.
Suppose, for example, that Posner is right that Scalia’s analysis in Heller suffers from the defect of “disregard for the interpretive conventions of the
legal culture” (scholarly opinion on this seems mixed).269 As a criticism of
originalist theory, the objection falls flat: the idea that “disregard for the interpretive conventions of the legal culture” in which constitutional provisions
were drafted and ratified is endemic to textual originalism is easily falsified.270 Likewise, Wilkinson contends that “originalism has failed to deliver
on its promise of restraint,”271 and he uses Heller as an example: “While Heller
can be hailed as a triumph of originalism, it can just as easily be seen as the
opposite—an exposé of original intent as a theory no less subject to judicial
subjectivity and endless argumentation as any other.”272 But as a criticism of
originalist theory, the blanket indictment is unwarranted. Wilkinson seems
unaware that leading contemporary academic originalists argue for originalism on other grounds and have disclaimed the promise of tight judicial constraint as a reason to adopt originalism.273
The failure to discuss the full breadth of originalist theory in the academic literature would be devastating if the judges’ criticisms were truly
266 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION viii (1990); see also POSNER,
supra note 7, at 256–62 (listing several examples); Posner, supra note 43; WILKINSON, supra
note 4, at 110; Wilkinson, supra note 98, at 166; Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 795-96.
267 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
268 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 193; WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 58.
269 POSNER, supra note 13, at 193.
270 See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 117 (2013) (developing “original methods originalism” through discussion
of “strong evidence that the original interpretive rules were essentially originalist in that
they tried to discover the meaning of a provision at the time of its enactment”).
271 WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 46.
272 Wilkinson, supra note 91, at 256.
273 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608
(2004) (contrasting “the new originalism” with “old originalism” on the ground that “[t]he
new originalism is less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to judicial restraint . . . .
[T]here seems to be less emphasis on the capacity of originalism to limit the discretion of
the judge.”).
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being offered as contributions to originalism (or anti-originalism) scholarship. But they are not best understood as offered in that spirit and their
value lies elsewhere. Their criticisms of originalism and their injunctions to
pragmatic and restrained adjudication are complaints about the ways in
which they believe that Justice Scalia’s opinion fails to display certain qualities of judicial excellence—qualities that pragmatism and restraint foster in
the disposition of the good judge.
That they are offering dispositional accounts of the judicial office and
judicial excellence rather than theories of interpretation or adjudication
hardly means, however, that their views are immune from criticism. To the
contrary, much can be said about the nature of judicial excellence and the
character of mind that represents judging at its best. Indeed, once judicial
pragmatism and judicial restraint are understood for what they truly are—
judicial dispositions or qualities of mind—a different angle of criticism
becomes apparent. This criticism focuses not on constitutional theory, but
on the adequacy and depth of their accounts of good judging. It takes on,
and takes issue with, their portraits of judicial greatness.
Consider again Judge Posner’s criticism that Heller exemplifies a more
general originalist “disregard for the interpretive conventions of the legal
culture in which the Second Amendment was drafted and ratified.”274 We
are now assessing this claim not as a statement of originalism’s flaws qua
interpretive theory, but as an exercise in intellectual history—as a description
of the dispositions and qualities of mind of good judging in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. And note further that to support his
point about what these conventions actually consist of, Posner refers back not
to a theory of constitutional interpretation but to a historical figure—indeed,
to a specific judge, Chief Justice John Marshall.275 Indeed, both Posner and
Wilkinson often speak in terms of “schools,” not theories, of judging276—
another indication that their primary focus is on dispositional or characterological qualities.
Yet taken in these terms, Posner’s claim is highly contestable as a statement of Marshall’s disposition toward the judicial office. Posner’s view is not
based on a comprehensive historical study of late eighteenth-century and
early nineteenth-century interpretive conventions, but on a contested
account of Marshall’s approach to constitutional interpretation as a
“loose . . . construction[ist].”277 Posner cites a smattering of judicial opinions, Madison’s Federalist No. 37, a law review article on the early American
judicial power by William Eskridge, and essays on Marshall by James Bradley
Thayer, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Felix Frankfurter.278 To be sure, these
all support Posner’s claim about Marshall and loose construction. But in his
eagerness to claim Marshall for pragmatism, Posner leaves out, among other
274 POSNER, supra note 13, at 193.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 155; see also Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 802.
277 POSNER, supra note 13, at 193 & 193 n.40.
278 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL205.txt

2014]

unknown

wilkinson

&

Seq: 45

posner

8-JAN-15

14:41

677

things, reference to more detailed accounts of Marshall’s jurisprudence in
constitutional cases,279 scholarly accounts of Madison’s understanding of the
judicial power,280 John Manning’s counterpoint to Eskridge’s article,281 and
more recent scholarly explorations of Marshall’s thought that provide important historiographical and jurisprudential perspective on Thayer’s, Holmes’s,
and Frankfurter’s appropriation of Marshall.282 A fuller portrait of Marshall’s approach to constitutional adjudication looks very different from the
“loose constructionist” sketched by Posner.283 In fact, the Marshallian ideal
invoked by Posner is largely a product of twentieth-century mythmaking.284
Yet the point is not simply, or even primarily, to criticize Posner’s
description of Marshall as a “loose constructionist.” It is to dispute crucial
features of the portrait of judicial excellence that emerge from this
account—features which are also on display in Posner’s writing at rest but
which are greatly muted in Posner’s writing at work (in that relatively small
percentage of decisions in which judicial pragmatism is detectable at all).
Marshall the “loose constructionist” is no more accurate a description of Marshall the judge than is Posner the “judicial pragmatist” an accurate description of Posner the judge. In Posner’s writing at rest, the extent to which law
is said to constrain and inform Marshallian and Posnerian judgment is minimized or glossed over in the process of sketching a distorted portrait of judicial excellence that overemphasizes the “coping strategies”285 judges employ
in order to compensate for the purported absence of law. In his writing at
279 For an account of Chief Justice Marshall’s commitment to what is now denominated
originalist reasoning, see GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 311–40 (2010). This is the bulk of chapter seven
of Professor McDowell’s book, a chapter titled “The Most Sacred Rule of Interpretation:
John Marshall, Originalism, and the Limits of Judicial Power.” For an explanation of the
sincerity of, and legal background behind, Marshall’s assertion in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States that “[c]ourts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing,” 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824), see CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 136–39 (1996).
280 See Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1513 (2002).
281 See John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (2001).
282 See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
466–79 (2001) (providing an historical account of the development of “[t]he Marshall
Myth and the Modern Nation-State”); see also ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL app. at 227 (1968) (providing a detailed analysis of Justice
Holmes’s account of Chief Justice Marshall); id. at 228 (concluding “that we have been
misled about the quality and character of the country’s original jurisprudence”). Posner’s
description of Marshall as an ancestor of Thayer and a “loose constructionist” derives from
Holmes’s famous address on the one hundredth anniversary of Chief Justice Marshall’s
accession to the bench. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266–71
(1920). The characterization is later picked up by Alexander Bickel in his discussion of
Thayer. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 36 (1962).
283 See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
284 See NEWMYER, supra note 282, at 473–79.
285 POSNER, supra note 13, at 149–235.
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work—even in those constitutional cases where coping strategies might seem
most needed—it is neither judicial pragmatism nor loose constructionism
that often plays the decisive role.286
Judge Posner would surely deny or deflect this criticism. He has argued
that judicial pragmatism encompasses structural and hierarchical limits on
judicial decisionmaking, just as it incorporates textual and historical considerations under the right circumstances, and just as it takes appropriately seriously the value of precedential constraint. Judicial pragmatism may
implement these features of adjudication for merely tactical reasons, but it
does implement them.287 Judicial pragmatism adopts whatever is good and
useful from legalistic methodology, discarding the rest. Posner would therefore contest the claim that his decisions are not simultaneously thoroughly
pragmatic and eminently law-like. Indeed, for Posner, the decision of a pragmatic judge acting within his authority just exactly is the law: “ ‘Judicial role’
is another name for the judge’s jurisdiction,”288 and “whatever judges do
within their jurisdiction is law.”289
Yet this denial only serves to underscore the inadequacy of judicial pragmatism as a guide for constitutional adjudication. Judge Posner may insist
that judicial pragmatism integrates the very judicial methodologies that he
has spent decades attacking extrajudicially, and he may be compelled to do
so in order to explain and justify the sorts of legally constrained decisions
that he himself has reached in the constitutional cases discussed in Part II.
But he thereby makes plain that judicial pragmatism neither can serve nor is
actually intended as a theoretical upgrade from legalism, or originalism, or
any other constitutional theory. Judicial pragmatism simply changes the subject; and in changing the subject, it paints a portrait of judicial excellence
that at best imperfectly, and at worst inaccurately, reflects even his own constitutional adjudication.
The same genre of criticisms applies to Judge Wilkinson’s depiction of
judicial restraint, and to the historical figures whom he associates with judicial greatness. For Wilkinson, judicial restraint is the label for a series of
“mundane and humdrum truths”290 that point backward toward “the values
of traditional adjudication.”291 “[W]isdom,” he writes, “lies simply in know286 This observation dovetails with a similar observation made by John Manning in an
essay on Posner’s approach to statutory interpretation. John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Structure, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (2007). Manning distinguishes
between the debate over “how a judge should read statutes in general” from the debate
over “how a judge should read statutes given the frame of reference supplied by our constitutional structure.” Id. at 1174. The contribution of Posner’s implicit or tacit sense of
constitutional structure “at work” explains why his judicial output does not resemble what
one might expect based solely on his “at rest” account of pragmatic adjudication.
287 POSNER, LAW, supra note 40, at 63.
288 Id. at 267.
289 POSNER, supra note 13, at 130.
290 WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 116.
291 Id. at 80.
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ing the limits of one’s knowledge,” and this wisdom has been neglected, or
forgotten, by the proponents of cosmic constitutional theory.292
Yet in Wilkinson’s account, the values of traditional adjudication were
only given their canonical formulation in the late nineteenth-century writing
of James Bradley Thayer. And many of Wilkinson’s heroes of judicial
restraint—Justice Holmes, Justice Frankfurter, and Justice Lewis Powell, for
example—either profoundly influenced or were themselves influenced by
the legal realism that emerged in subsequent decades. Indeed, judged as a
historical phenomenon, there is nothing timeless or particularly shopworn
about judicial restraint. Judicial restraint in the hands of Thayer was a strategic reaction to the burgeoning challenge of legal indeterminacy that would
come to a head in the legal realist and critical legal studies periods just a few
decades later.
Viewed in this historical light, Thayerian judicial restraint does not sit
outside the cosmic theories that Wilkinson criticizes. It does not, as Posner
believes, precede the rise of constitutional theory.293 Thayer’s judicial
restraint is the very first cosmic constitutional theory. It is “cosmic” precisely
inasmuch as it was offered as an ersatz version of the truly cosmic view of law
that long held sway before it—the understanding of law as a locus of transtemporal, transcendent truth with its own internal logic.294 Thayer meant to
replace preemptively what later writers have denounced as “transcendental
nonsense”295—the ancient and metaphysically robust view of law that was
already under siege at the time Thayer wrote. That Holmes should be a hero
to Wilkinson is puzzling, since it was Holmes who vigorously and cheerfully
heralded the impending demise of the traditional view of law and judging
during that same period.296
The particular challenge that Thayer confronted was the constitutional
function of the judge in a late nineteenth-century world in which law’s own
cosmic foundations had begun to crumble. Unlike Wilkinsonian judicial
restraint, Thayerian judicial restraint is a cosmic theory because it offers a
single, stable, guiding precept of constitutional adjudication—Thayer’s “rule
of administration”—to the judge in the post-lapsarian legal universe: judges
292 Id. at xii (ed. note).
293 POSNER, supra note 13, at 166.
294 See Steven D. Smith, “Hollow Men”? Law and the Declension of Belief, in CIVILIZING
AUTHORITY 197, 206 (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2007) (“For centuries, it was a common view among Western legal thinkers that law was a manifestation of something that
transcended mundane human enactments and human decisions.”); see also Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (“[I]t will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts
constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of
themselves laws.”); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 38–39 (1983) (discussing the disintegration of “[t]he old metalaw” as a way of giving coherence to the Western legal tradition).
295 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 811 (1935).
296 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
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“can only disregard [an] Act when those who have the right to make laws
have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear
that it is not open to rational question.”297 True, Thayer purported to locate
this rule in a rather slapdash American history of judicial review that suited
his theoretical purposes, but no court had ever before offered up a single
guiding precept of constitutional adjudication in the way Thayer did. There
was no need for a theory of judicial review when law was itself understood to
structure and set limits on a judge’s office.298
Once Thayer’s fixed principle of judicial restraint is understood not as a
distillation of timeless, commonsense judicial wisdom but as a historically specific rearguard reaction in the early phases of constitutional theory’s ascendancy, the flaws in Wilkinson’s portrait of judicial excellence become clearer.
Wilkinson’s judicial heroes are all inheritors of Thayer’s apologetic project;
and with each adaptation of judicial restraint in their hands, judicial
restraint’s impotence to replace the truly cosmic understanding of law
became plainer. Holmes’s famously skeptical pronouncement that “[y]ou
can give any conclusion a logical form”299 is genealogically connected to
Thayerian restraint: both are expressions of proto-realism, and Holmes’s
position provides a vital premise for adhering strictly to Thayer’s rule of
administration. If “any” conclusion may be given a legal form, the crucial
issue is neither the law nor the conclusion, but the authority of the person
making law and reaching conclusions. Thayer’s restraint is a judicial defense
mechanism against what he perceived as the “inescapably political” quality of
law.300
Thayer’s influence on Frankfurter has been remarked before,301 but
Frankfurter’s adherence to judicial restraint was again a historically specific
defensive action against the perceived antiprogressive and antidemocratic
intrusiveness and obstructionism of the pre-1937 New Deal Court. Upon his
appointment in 1939, Frankfurter, drawing on Holmes and Thayer before
297 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF CONLAW 18 (1893).
298 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 18 (2008) (arguing that in the history of constitutionalism before the advent of “judicial review,” “[i]t was widely assumed
that human law existed within a hierarchy that reached from God down to man and that
therefore even human law had a divinely derived obligation”); see also id. at 309 (discussing
a statute’s “manifest contradiction” with the Constitution not as implicating merely a judicial “‘rule of administration’” like Thayer’s, but as instead generating a judicial duty that
“arose from the obligation of law in conscience”).
299 Holmes, supra note 296, at 466.
300 POSNER, supra note 13, at 154.
301 BICKEL, supra note 282, at 35; see also Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 354–55 (2013). Frankfurter’s description of Thayer’s
Origin and Scope article is revealing inasmuch as he himself takes it to offer something very
similar to a constitutional theory: “[F]rom my point of view it’s the great guide for judges
and therefore, the great guide for understanding by non-judges of what the place of the
judiciary is in relation to constitutional questions.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER
REMINISCES 300 (Harlan B. Philips ed., 1960).

STITUTIONAL
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him, could expound a general jurisprudence of judicial review that also
suited his political inclinations. His veneration of Holmesian restraint took
shape against the backdrop of resisting the judicial conservatism that had
deployed substantive due process and ideas of freedom of contract to defeat
what Frankfurter believed was socially important economic legislation.302
One historian has described “[t]he tragedy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter” as
the vice of becoming “prisoner [to] an idea—judicial restraint,”303 one
which eventually led Frankfurter to well-documented defeats in the aftermath of Minersville School District v. Gobitis.304 Yet the tragedy was not Frankfurter’s, but judicial restraint’s. Frankfurter’s error was not in pledging
allegiance to an idea, but to the wrong idea. Frankfurter’s defeat was borne
from judicial restraint’s inability to bear the cosmic burden laid on it by its
champions in response to the realist challenge, a failure that had been in
evidence since well before Frankfurter’s time. And this is precisely the problem for Judge Wilkinson’s school of judicial restraint: it is a school whose
notions of judicial excellence depended on an idea that had no persuasive
responses to the problematics of constitutional adjudication in the twentieth
century.305
C.

Judge Friendly’s View of Judicial Excellence

In keeping with the move from theory to disposition, and with the
judges’ emphasis on judicial exemplars, we suggest that in the post–legal
realist twentieth century, Judge Henry Friendly’s view of constitutional theory
and his understanding of judicial excellence provide a more appealing (even
if more impressionistic) portrait of judicial excellence than those sketched by
Judge Posner and Judge Wilkinson. Friendly, who sat on the Second Circuit
from 1959 to 1986 and is regarded by some as “the greatest judge of his
302 See Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas
and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J.
71, 81–82.
303 Id. at 95.
304 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
305 Snyder interprets Frankfurter’s judicial restraint as an early example of popular constitutionalism. Snyder, supra note 301, at 350. He also claims that Frankfurter favored
departmentalism. Id. at 351. If that is the correct view of Frankfurter’s jurisprudence,
three further problems emerge. First, it is doubtful that Wilkinson would continue to
claim Frankfurter as a judicial role model. Wilkinson’s jurisprudence is not that of popular
constitutionalism. Second, if Frankfurter favored both popular constitutionalism and
departmentalism, his position seems in tension with itself. Popular constitutionalism
places authority in the people’s hands; departmentalism places authority in the hands of
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments. Third, popular constitutionalism is, to
date, largely an academic phenomenon. It has had no perceptible influence on the federal judiciary. This is not the place to discuss its own failings. See Lawrence B. Solum &
Larry Alexander, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (reviewing
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004)). Suffice it to say, however, that it cannot bear the cosmic burden either:
the people themselves seem quite content with a powerful judiciary.
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era,”306 was conversant with contemporary debates in legal theory. And like
Posner and Wilkinson, Friendly, too, wrote extrajudicially on a range of
issues.307 Yet an important contrast between Posner and Wilkinson, on the
one hand, and Friendly, on the other, is that Friendly did not attempt to
place a theoretical umbrella over or assign a label to his approach to judging.
Posner has claimed Friendly for judicial pragmatism,308 and one can easily imagine Wilkinson drawing on Friendly’s decisions in constitutional cases
to claim him for judicial restraint. Yet Friendly himself steadfastly avoided
affixing any label to his approach to adjudication.309 Guided by his example,
we consider Friendly’s stance toward academic theory on its own terms. For
even as Friendly distanced himself from the enterprise of academic theorizing about adjudication, his extrajudicial writing can help us better understand the scope and limits of such theorizing. In particular, we consider here
how Friendly’s extrajudicial writings underwrite an internal critique and an
external critique of an emblematic example of constitutional theory—Professor Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.
In 1975, the Harvard Law Review published Dworkin’s famous article,
Hard Cases, in which he took up a debate with H.L.A. Hart over the exercise
of judicial discretion in cases of legal indeterminacy.310 As summarized by
Friendly, Hart understood judges to “exercise a ‘legislative’ discretion in
which policy considerations may be taken into account,” while Dworkin
argued that “the judge may rely on a newly discovered but nevertheless preexisting ‘principle’ . . . but not on considerations of ‘policy.’ ”311 But
Friendly declined to engage in this dispute. He tried to “remain aloof” from
the debate, noting its vigor and length as well as his “own deficiencies”: “In
jurisprudential controversies of this sort I tend to agree with whomever I have
read last.”312
Judge Friendly’s demurral is hard to credit. He did not shy away from
other vigorous, long-standing debates and he was obviously intellectually able
enough to participate. More probably, he simply believed that the debate
did not matter to judges: “[I]t is not clear to me how far apart, in any practi306 See DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY (2012).
307 For a full listing of Friendly’s extrajudicial writings, see id. app. B at 367–70.
308 Posner and Friendly enjoyed a warm and substantial correspondence when Posner
became a judge, meeting on several occasions. See William Domnarski, The Correspondence
of Henry Friendly and Richard A. Posner 1982-86, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 395 (2011).
309 Perhaps this is in part explained by the fact that before becoming a judge, Friendly
was in private practice, while Posner and Wilkinson were both in the legal academy.
Although Friendly himself avoided adopting a label, Judge Posner is not alone in describing Friendly as a pragmatist. See Daniel L. Breen, Henry J. Friendly and the Pragmatic
Tradition in American Law 14–18 (Nov. 22, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston
College) (on file with author) (depicting Friendly as an exemplar of American judicial
pragmatism).
310 See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
311 Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 21, 24 n.14 (1978).
312 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL205.txt

2014]

unknown

wilkinson

&

Seq: 51

posner

8-JAN-15

14:41

683

cally significant sense, the disputants really are.”313 In the words of Edmund
Ursin, “Friendly’s view was that Dworkin’s jurisprudence (and, of course, that
of those who would follow his lead and pursue abstract theorizing) would be
of little use to those concerned with how judges actually decide cases.”314
The influence of day-to-day considerations on Judge Friendly’s perspective as an intermediate appellate judge explains the remoteness of Friendly’s
concerns from Dworkin’s. Had Dworkin addressed Friendly,315 he likely
would have argued that “law as integrity”—which requires judges to combine
the dimensions of “fit” and “justification”316—accounts for the particular
obligations and functions that a hierarchical system imposes on a judge. But
the idea that judges bring to constitutional adjudication a distinctive perspective that arises out of their particular role within the judicial hierarchy issues
in both an internal and an external critique of Dworkin’s theory.
The internal critique focuses on the need to account for judicial role as
an element either of “fit” or “justification.” Dworkin’s beau ideal is Hercules,
“an imaginary judge of superhuman intellectual power and patience who
accepts law as integrity” and its demands of fit and justification.317 It matters
not to Dworkin’s theory just what court Hercules sits on.318 This is a problem
for a theory in which judicial role is a component either of fit or justification.
All federal judges exercise the “judicial power” vested in them by Article III,
but each judge’s role depends in part on where he or she sits in the hierarchy. The roles of district court judges, circuit court judges, and Supreme
Court Justices are not the same. Dworkin describes “fit” as a “threshold” issue
for all judges, but he also acknowledges that after an interpretation passes
313 Id. (emphasis added). Friendly nevertheless made clear that he sided with Hart
over Dworkin, describing the move to strict products liability as resting on judicial considerations of policy and criticizing Dworkin for trying to recast the move as one based on
principle. See id. at 27 n.30.
314 Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and
Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1267, 1349 (2009).
315 As far as we are aware, Dworkin never wrote about Friendly.
316 Judgments of “fit” provide a “rough threshold requirement that an interpretation of
some part of the law must meet if it is to be eligible at all.” Judgments of justification occur
when the “threshold test” of fit “does not discriminate between two or more interpretations” of the law, and in which a judge “must choose between eligible interpretations by
asking which shows the community’s structure of institutions and decisions—its public
standards as a whole—in a better light from the standpoint of political morality.” Judgments of justification thus assume cardinal importance in hard cases. RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 255–56 (1986).
317 Id. at 239; see also Dworkin, supra note 310, at 1083.
318 When Dworkin first introduces him in Hard Cases, Hercules is “a judge in some
representative American jurisdiction,” Dworkin, supra note 320, at 1083, where he may still
be found at the beginning of Law’s Empire. In a chapter toward the end of Law’s Empire
discussing “The Constitution,” Dworkin imagines that “Hercules is promoted” to the
Supreme Court (“Olympus”), where Dworkin has him consider various cases dealing with
racial equality. DWORKIN, supra note 316, at 379. Yet there is virtually no difference
between the duties of Justice Hercules and Judge Hercules, no change in their respective
obligations.
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that “threshold,” “any infelicities of fit will count against it . . . in the general
balance of political virtues.”319 Even assuming that “the general balance of
political virtues”320 supplies a coherent criterion, however, the balance
should be struck differently at different levels of the federal judicial hierarchy—precisely because of variations in judicial role. A district court judge
deciding an issue of first impression in a case that is sure to be appealed, for
example, should weigh fit more heavily than should a higher court.321 The
point is not simply that Hercules has a judicial “view from nowhere,” but that
a judicial view from nowhere cannot serve as an ideal for any judge. Judges
always sit somewhere.322
An external critique of Dworkin emerges in Judge Friendly’s entirely different perspective on judicial excellence. In Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly
Become Judge, Friendly described some of the specialized skills of the appellate
judge, qualities that develop from the “grist of an appellate court”—the vast
majority of cases that comprise the appellate docket, in which either “ ‘the
law and its application alike are plain’ ” or “ ‘the rule of law is certain, and the
application alone doubtful.’ ”323 In the course of deciding these cases, the
generalist judge acquires a “specialized competence” by “sharpening his skills
on a variety of grindstones.”324 Friendly’s description of these skills is worth
quoting at length:
He will have acquired the power of analysis, of determining the issues—
often quite other than what the parties think these to be. He will have
learned to heed the imperative of going to the sources; experience will have
taught him, if wisdom has not, never to rely on a characterization or on
memory of what a witness has testified, a document stated, an opinion ruled,
a statute commanded. He knows how to find these sources with speed and
accuracy, and how to deal with them once they have been found. He understands how to pick evidence apart, to determine the inferences that may
reasonably be drawn, to weigh one piece of testimony against another. He
will have acquired some skill in the understanding of decisions and their
precedential value; he will have learned something also about the reading of
319 DWORKIN, supra note 316, at 256. This part of the book is quoted in John M. Finnis,
On Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire, 6 LAW & PHIL. 357, 374 (1987) available at http://
scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/677.
320 DWORKIN, supra note 316, at 256.
321 Cf. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 790 (E.D. Va. 2010),
vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (“This case . . . turns on atypical and uncharted
applications of constitutional law interwoven with subtle political undercurrents. The outcome of this case has significant public policy implications. And the final word will
undoubtedly reside with a higher court.”).
322 This criticism is not to be confused with the claim that Hercules is an unhelpful
model because no judge has his superhuman powers or his freedom from “the press of
time and docket.” DWORKIN, supra note 316, at 380. Bracketing certain human constraints
and practical issues is one way to formulate an ideal approach to judging. But certain
institution-specific considerations such as judicial role are not bracketable.
323 Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 222
(1961) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164 (1921)).
324 Id. at 223.
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statutes. He will have trained himself to test his conclusions by essaying to
put them in writing, and to express them fairly, clearly, and cogently.325

Friendly’s views have been echoed by other judges.326 And Friendly’s
use of the passive voice in describing the acquisition of some of these skills
captures a feature of judging within a hierarchical system often underappreciated by academic theorists. The enterprise is not simply one in which a
judge works upon cases, but also one in which the cases work upon the
judge.327
In light of Judge Friendly’s view of judicial excellence, it is not surprising
that he would be uninterested in engaging the work of a theorist who aimed
to expose “the hidden structure of [real judges’] judgments” as “if they had a
career to devote to a single decision.”328 Friendly did not criticize Dworkin
for imagining the god-like Hercules as his model judge. He did not comment on Hercules at all. But another distinguished federal appellate judge,
senior Ninth Circuit Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., did. Noonan observed that
Hercules resembles a law professor more than a judge:329 “[T]he decision of
cases affecting real people demands a sensitivity that handling hypothetical
ones does not.”330 The proper exercise of judicial discretion requires, he
wrote, an element of practical wisdom that is not “captured in any of Mr.
Dworkin’s formulations.”331 Instead, this practical wisdom is cultivated by a
sensitivity to real people that “is nurtured by experience” and “eventuates
in . . . prudence.”332
325 Id. at 222.
326 See, e.g., Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 2, 14 (2010) (describing Friendly’s opinions as “the gold standard in American
appellate judging” and asserting that “Friendly’s way of judging has a timeless attraction:
the predicate mastery of precedent and record; a care alike for doctrine and for equity and
for social need; the reasoned and candid explanation of the result; and an awareness
always of the comparative competencies and limits of judges”); Richard A. Posner, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the
Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 779 (1983) (describing “a skill at judging that
comes from long practice in evaluating arguments of counsel, decisions of trial judges, and
trial records and that is a legitimate fruit of specialization in the function of appellate
judging”); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, If It Ain’t Broke . . ., 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67 (2010),
available at http://yalelawjournal.org/pdf/840_egpccc2c.pdf.
327 Cf. Walton H. Hamilton, Judicial Process, in 4 ENCYC. OF THE SOC. SCI. 450 (Edwin
R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1932) (“In the instance the suits are controlled by the
rules; in the aggregate the rules are determined by the suits.”). The idea that time spent as
a judge leaves its mark on the individual holding judicial office can be seen in the title of
Friendly’s book of collected essays. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS (1967).
328 DWORKIN, supra note 316, at 265.
329 Noonan does not intend this as an insult, for he was a full-time law professor himself
before he was appointed to the bench.
330 John T. Noonan, Jr., Hercules and the Snail Darter, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1986, http://
www.nytimes.com/1986/05/25/books/hercules-and-the-snail-darter.html.
331 Id.
332 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL205.txt

686

unknown

Seq: 54

notre dame law review

8-JAN-15

14:41

[vol. 90:2

Judge Friendly would have agreed with Judge Noonan, for he much preferred Judge Learned Hand to Dworkin’s learned Judge Hercules.333 Of the
judges Friendly identified as great, Hand was “the only one who served as a
federal circuit judge and not on a court of last resort.”334 Friendly admired
Hand less for decisions in “the few great cases that inevitably came to him
over the years” than for “the great way in which he dealt with a multitude of
little cases, covering almost every subject in the legal lexicon. Repeatedly he
would make the tiniest glowworm illumine a whole field.”335 By contrast,
Dworkin, who served as a law clerk for Hand, wrote in highly qualified and
comparatively negative terms about Hand’s view of constitutional adjudication (he wrote warmly of Hand himself). In a late chapter of Freedom’s Law,
Dworkin criticizes Hand’s extreme and “austere view” that “there was no warrant in the Constitution for judges having any power to invalidate the acts of
another ‘department’ of government.”336 Likewise, Dworkin rebuffed
Hand’s warning about rule by philosopher-judges as “a piece of
hyperbole.”337
Yet Dworkin was not indifferent or insensitive to the actual lived experience, insights, and perceptions of judges like Friendly. He developed Hercules in part to account for the phenomenon that “when good judges try to
explain in some general way how they work, they search for figures of speech
to describe the constraints they feel even when they suppose that they are
making new law, constraints that would not be appropriate if they were legislators.”338 Judges say, for example, “that they find new rules imminent [sic]
in the law as a whole” or “that the law has some life of its own even though
this belongs to experience rather than logic.”339 Dworkin views these statements as signposts to guide Hercules in his quest for law as integrity. “Hercules must not rest content with these famous metaphors and personifications,
but he must also not be content with any description of the judicial process
that ignores their appeal to the best lawyers.”340 These signposts matter from
Friendly’s perspective as well, but they point in a different direction. From
his perspective, attention to what “good judges” say extrajudicially when they
“try to explain in some general way how they work,” and also to what they do
when they engage in the activity of judging itself, highlights the need for
333 Friendly’s biographer, David Dorsen, reports that Friendly’s “favorite judge was
Learned Hand.” DORSEN, supra note 306, at 123.
334 Id.
335 FRIENDLY, supra note 327, at 315.
336 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 339 (1996); see also id. at 341–42 (“Hand’s skepticism consisted not in the philosophical view that no moral conviction can be objectively
true, but in a disabling uncertainty that he—or anyone else—could discover which convictions were true.”). Dworkin tried to reconcile his views with Hand’s in this chapter but the
differences in their respective approaches to adjudication are striking. See Noah R. Feldman, Unresolved Tensions, 106 YALE L.J. 229, 234 (1996) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra).
337 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 71 (1985).
338 Dworkin, supra note 310, at 1090.
339 Id.
340 Id.
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deeper and closer investigation of judicial excellence from their internal
point of view.341
The point of view Judge Posner adopts in his most recent book—Reflections on Judging—is exemplary in this regard.342 And his defense of Friendly
in that book against Professor Adrian Vermeule’s assessment that “Friendly’s
contribution was not to enrich the theory of the law but to provide a living
model of lawyerly craft and good judgment” is illuminating.343 Contending
that “Vermeule’s assessment underrates Friendly,” Posner writes that “[m]any
of Friendly’s ideas, expressed either in his opinions or in his very influential
nonjudicial writings, were adopted by the Supreme Court, which having
done so got the credit for them.”344 Yet this response does not directly
counter Vermeule’s assessment; that the Supreme Court’s adopted many of
Friendly’s ideas does not show that Friendly enriched legal theory, but that
his hierarchical superiors valued those ideas as products of lawyerly craft and
good judgment. To show that Vermeule underrates Friendly, one would
need to argue instead that Vermeule underrates the lawyerly craft and good
judgment that he and others see in Friendly. Evidence that he may do so
appears in Vermeule’s formulation of “[t]he puzzle” about Friendly, namely
that he was brilliant and is lauded by prominent “hagiographers and celebrants,” but “it is actually a bit difficult to say what Friendly stood for, or what
ideas of general and lasting significance he contributed to law and legal theory.”345 This is only a puzzle, of course, if one expects that a brilliant judge
should be expected to contribute “ideas of general and lasting significance . . . to law and legal theory.”346
Vermeule may be right that “the reputations of judges such as Friendly
generally have a shorter half-life than the reputations of judges who offer
fertile theoretical ideas that can be distilled into formulas, theorems, and
pithy aphorisms.”347 But if he is right, it may well be because of the peculiar
341 Id.
342 POSNER, supra note 13. But cf. Kevin C. Walsh, Posner on Realist Judging, JOTWELL,
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/posner-on-realist-judging/ (contending that
the book’s chapters addressing theories of judicial restraint and interpretation “fit uneasily
into the book because Posner’s reduction of these ideas to judicial attempts to escape from
complexity are unconvincing”).
343 Adrian Vermeule, Local Wisdom, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www
.newrepublic.com/book/review/henry-friendly-supreme-court-david-dorsen (review of
DORSEN, supra note 306).
344 POSNER, supra note 13, at 356.
345 Vermeule, supra note 343.
346 Id. Later in the review, Vermeule remains uncommitted in the “eternal competition between different models of what counts as good judging.” Id. In an earlier work,
Vermeule advocates “for both statutes and the Constitution, an interpretive decision-procedure that leaves little room for judicial creativity, for the aesthetic rigors and rewards of
lawyerly guild-craft in its more baroque forms, and for the elaborate study of Supreme
Court decisionmaking.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 285 (2006).
347 Vermeule, supra note 343.
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reputational preoccupations of the legal academy, where theoretical sophistication, even in judges, is more highly valued than good judgment.348
CONCLUSION
Nearly two centuries ago, the judge-scholar Justice Joseph Story criticized “collateral interpretation” of the Constitution derived from “theory”
and praised “the practical exposition of the government itself in its various
departments” for its resemblance to judicial exposition.349 Story was not
indulging in anti-intellectual peevishness. He was marking the difference
between constitutional theory in vacuo and constitutional exposition in a specific public, practical setting—the setting of the judicial office: “How light,
compared with these means of instruction, are the private lucubrations of the
closet, or the retired speculations of ingenious minds, intent on theory, or
general views, and unused to encounter a practical difficulty at every step!”350
What Justice Story had in mind was not a theory, but the disposition of judicial excellence. We have suggested that the same is true of Judge Posner and
Judge Wilkinson.
Despite the occasional packaging, the critique of constitutional theory
offered by Judges Posner and Wilkinson as well as their own approaches are
not best understood as rivals to or replacements of existing constitutional
theory at all. When they write extrajudicially about constitutional law, they
are not dogs walking on their hind legs. They walk on all fours in developing
their own accounts of the good judge at work in constitutional cases. And
the insights derived from these accounts illuminate the need for further
reflection on the nature of judicial role and judicial duty within the American constitutional system. Their extrajudicial writings point toward the utility
of sources of nontheoretical insight into adjudication, including critical judicial biographies, intellectual judicial histories, and other work in which
judges engage in self-reflection and situate their own thought in relation to
their peers, past and present.
Most especially, however, the dimensions of judicial role and judicial
excellence examined in this Article call for renewed attention to that most
conventional source of insight about adjudication: judicial opinions. Doctrinal mastery was once the primary function of legal academics. Doctrine’s fall
from academic grace may exacerbate the sense—perhaps it exacerbated
Chief Justice Roberts’s sense—that the practice of law is one thing, its academic study another. It is no doubt true that these are different activities
with different aims. But to the extent that academic work in constitutional
law may be useful for constitutional adjudication, this Article suggests that a
focus on the ways in which academic ideas about constitutional law translate
into actual opinions and doctrine is imperative. The best understanding of
348 Boudin, supra note 326.
349 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
(1833).
350 Id.
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judicial role and duty does not sit outside constitutional decisionmaking, but
instead emerges from careful and sustained attention to the practice of constitutional judging itself.
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